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The innovative transmission expansion policy introduced in Argentina in 1992 has been 
refined and modified since then. Refinements include provision for transmission 
companies and others to propose quality and substation expansions. There have been 
several such expansions, and no lack of investment in quality and reliability of supply.  A 
‘second round of reforms’ in 1998 introduced transmission rights and a method of ‘risk-
bearing expansions’. These and other reforms were rescinded before they became 
effective. In 1999 a Federal Transmission Plan was introduced, to build lines designated 
by the federal and provincial governments. This reflected a decision to give greater 
weight to political rather than economic considerations, rather than a failure to meet the 
original economic aims of reform. The original reform led to less investment in major 
transmission lines but used existing lines more intensively, which was more efficient. 
Competition to construct expansions developed, and led to lower construction costs. 
Thus, contrary to a widespread perception, the Argentine transmission expansion 
mechanism was a considerable success in terms of meeting the requirements of users 
efficiently. This experience suggests that involving users in the regulation of monopoly 
networks is feasible, and the scope for it may be greater than generally appreciated. 
However, the reconciliation of economic and political considerations needs further 
consideration. 
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Argentina’s electricity reform introduced in 1992 is widely regarded as successful. 
However, the transmission expansion element of that policy is regarded as unsuccessful, 
as exemplified by a delay to the Fourth Line from Comahue to Buenos Aires. Part One of 
this paper explained that the reason for the policy was because conventional regulation 
could not be trusted to deliver more efficient investment decisions. The Fourth Line was 
in fact uneconomic, and delay was beneficial. In terms of economic efficiency, the 
episode illustrated a success rather than a failure of the reform. 
 
Since 1992 there have been discussions and further reforms, including with respect to 
quality of service, the role of distribution companies, the Area of Influence method and 
transmission rights, culminating in a second round of reforms in 1998. Since then there 
has been a new Federal Plan for regional expansions, and a change in policy direction 
mainly since the financial crisis. Part Two of this paper examines the nature of these 
reforms and changes, and the lessons to be learned. 
 
1. Quality of supply 
 
The quality of supply in general improved after privatisation. In 1997 the Government 
asked CAMMESA to investigate the situation, and its report did not identify any lack of 
investment in quality of supply. Resolution 208/1998 nonetheless provided a special 
procedure to facilitate quality of supply expansions. Only two quality expansions have 
been proposed under that route, of which one was rejected for reasons more related to the 
provincial regulation of distribution companies. Calculations suggest that the reliability 
benefits of further major expansions would be only a fraction of the costs involved. The 
Public Contest method has not failed to deliver needed quality expansions. 
 
2. Distribution companies 
 
Distribution companies were expected to play a role in maintaining and improving 
quality of supply. Regulatory arrangements for distribution companies differ with respect 
to responsibility for transmission failures and obligation to pass on penalties paid by 
transmission companies, and ability to pass on costs of transmission expansions. This 
variety reflects Argentina’s federal nature. Penalties for non-supplied energy were 
intended to provide an incentive to support transmission expansion: in practice ENRE 
reduced these penalties over time. In a widely cited case two distribution companies had 
voted against a quality expansion proposed by the transmission company (a reserve 
transformer in Bariloche area). But their provincial regulators had indicated that they did 
not consider the investment economic. In other cases distribution companies did support 
transmission expansions. It was not that the original scheme was applied and failed: it 
was not fully applied. Several provincial governments are now developing their own 
arrangements within the Public Contest framework. 
   3
3. Second round of reforms 
 
In 1997 the government commissioned studies to extend the competitive market. These 
identified the Area of Influence method and the absence of transmission rights as major 
deficiencies. The Area of influence method had been introduced for reasons of 
practicality. Despite its limitations, consultants to the Secretary of Energy could not 
identify a better method. In a ‘second round of reforms’ in 1999 the government left the 
method in place. The government also proposed congestion rights and a new ‘risk-
bearing expansion’ method to allow a wider range of participation. 
  
4. The Federal Plan 
 
Provincial governments pressed for more regional expansions. In 1999 the outgoing 
Menem government increased a surcharge on electricity to establish a Federal 
Transmission Fund to be allocated by the Federal Council of provincial governments. 
The incoming government made the Federal Transmission Plan a priority, with the 
objective to finance transmission expansions that the Secretary of Energy identifies as 
financeable. It introduced a new Open Season method for inviting private participation, 
and suspended the previous second round of reforms. The Golden Rule (transmission 
expansions should lower total costs) did not in practice apply to such expansions. Five 
(later four) new regional lines were identified, that would also link the radial system into 
a meshed network. 
 
5. Temporary reversal of policy 
 
In March 2001 the impending economic crisis led to the recall of Carlos Bastos, who had 
introduced the original reforms. He suspended the Federal Plan and reinstated variants 
and extensions of the earlier market-oriented reforms. Within a few months Congress 
repealed these measures. 
 
6. The crisis and afterwards 
 
The economic crisis led to devaluation, pesification and price freezes. In 2003 there was a 
temporary process for Upgrade expansions paid for to a greater extent by all users. The 
Federal Plan was relaunched. The Patagonian Line is going ahead but other lines have 
been delayed by shortage of funds. The Salex Fund has been used for various purposes, 
including compensating generators for international oil prices in face of frozen tariffs. 
 
8. Review of performance 
 
There have been significant transmission expansions since the 1992 reform, but fewer 
lines than previously. The Fourth Line is the main line built under the Public Contest 
method. The emphasis has shifted to other investments to make better use of the existing 
system. There has been valuable investment in enhancing system control. Competitive 
tender has roughly halved the cost of building new lines. There have been up to four bids 
for each major expansion, and several new transmission companies are now in operation.   4
There has been a significant overall improvement in the performance of the transmission 
system. 
 
9. Economists’ concerns about a market approach 
 
Economists have expressed various concerns about a market approach in the context of 
merchant interconnectors. Concerns include market imperfections, lumpy investments, 
stochastic capacity, conflicts of interest with existing operators leading to inefficiencies, 
loop flows, coordination problems between market participants, gaming, and lack of 
forward markets. In practice, these issues have generally not been problematic in the 
context of the Public Contest method in Argentina: some issues are less serious in a radial 
network, some were foreseen and dealt with, some do not characterise the way market 




Argentina’s policy of transmission expansion has been widely held to be unsuccessful. 
The delayed Fourth Line is usually cited as evidence. Part One of this paper showed that 
that experience was in many respects a success rather than a failure. Other criticisms are 
that the approach has failed to deliver quality of supply, partly as a result of reluctance of 
distribution companies to participate; that the Public Contest method was deficient, that 
transmission rights were lacking; that there were problems in achieving consensus among 
the parties. Part Two has shown that there is no substance in most of these claims; that 
quality investments have not been lacking; that provincial governments rather than the 
Public Contest method hindered participation of distribution companies; that reforms 
introduced congestion rights but were suspended by a subsequent government for reasons 
unrelated to economic efficiency. The approach of the 1990s that emphasised the 
competitive market has now been replaced by federal and provincial planning, using 
regional expansions to encourage growth and development of the sector. The original 
approach has been replaced, not because it was economically inefficient but because it 
was politically unacceptable. 
 
In comparing market and regulation, economic analysis needs to recognise that regulation 
and government have public choice objectives that influence their decisions. In 
Argentina, as in Australia, governments have built transmission lines beyond the point of 
economic efficiency. In contrast, contrary to widespread views, the market approach in 
Argentina seems to have led to economically efficient outcomes except where influenced 
otherwise by government. It is for consideration how far competitive tender and the 
involvement of users can be extended to other sectors and countries. How best to deal 
with the combination of economic and non-economic objectives is also a challenge. But 
experience in Argentina shows that involving users in network investment decisions may 
be more effective than generally recognised. 
   5
Introduction 
 
From 1992 to 2002, major expansion of the Argentine electricity transmission sector 
depended on users proposing, voting and paying for such expansions, via the so-called 
Public Contest method. Many commentators hold this policy to have been unsuccessful, 
and in particular to have delayed much-needed investment in the “Fourth Line”. Part One 
of this paper
4 examined Argentine policy and experience, with specific emphasis on the 
following questions: 
-  Why, given the potential difficulties involved, did Argentina nonetheless adopt 
this novel scheme for transmission expansion? 
-  Is there evidence that the mechanism unnecessarily and uneconomically delayed 
investment in the “Fourth Line”, or exhibited other problems?  
 
The experience of inefficiency and over-expansion of transmission in the state-owned era 
led policymakers to conclude that the conventional regulatory framework could not be 
trusted to deliver more efficient investment decisions. Closer examination of the Fourth 
Line experience suggests that the Fourth Line was uneconomic, and the decision to delay 
the investment pending further analysis was beneficial. The Public Contest method 
subjected transmission expansion decisions to economic decision-making for the first 
time, and the Fourth Line experience demonstrated the need for convincing reasons for 
new investment. The lack of replication of the Fourth Line as demand has continued to 
grow does not indicate that the method for regulating electricity transmission expansion 
has failed, but rather that it is more economic to transport gas to the Buenos Aires area, 
and to generate electricity there, than to build new lines to transmit electricity. The Fourth 
Line experience should be regarded as a success rather than a failure.  
 
Since the Fourth Line debate, there have been continued discussions, notably about the 
area of influence method and transmission rights. There have also been several policy 
developments, notably concerning quality of supply expansions, and a second round of 
reforms in 1999, including so-called ‘risk-bearing expansions’. During the two Menem 
governments (1989-1999) these reforms typically reflected, refined and extended the pro-
market policy developed by Carlos Bastos (Secretary of Energy 1991-96). Then came the 
creation of a Federal Transmission Fund and – with a change of government - a Federal 
Transmission Plan and a change of policy. Just before the economic crisis of late 2001 
Carlos Bastos returned briefly to office, and policies were temporarily reversed. 
However, since the crisis there has been a further increase in the role of government and 
a corresponding reduction in the role of market participants.  
 
The present paper examines how and why the initial regulatory mechanism for 
transmission expansion has been modified over time, and what effects this has had. It 
examines criticisms of the initial mechanism, and identifies what lessons can be learned 
from this experience for the success or otherwise of the initial and innovative policy on 
transmission expansion. It is organised in ten sections: Quality of supply and substations, 
Distribution companies, Second round reforms, the Federal Plan, the Temporary reversal 
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of policy, the Crisis and thereafter, a Review of the performance of the arrangement, and 
a discussion of Economists’ concerns about the market approach, and Conclusions. 
 
1.  Quality of supply 
 
1.1 Concerns about quality of supply and CAMMESA’s investigation 
 
In general, the quality of supply in Argentina improved considerably after privatisation. 
For example, Table 1 sets out the extent of non-supplied energy in the Argentine system 
as a whole, in each year since privatisation. There was a particularly significant reduction 
over the first few years, followed by a moreorless steady performance except for higher 
outages in 1999 and again in 2002 after the economic crisis. 
 





reduction  Shortages  Total (MWh) 
1992  122  3  125 
1993  43  14  57 
1994  9  15  24 
1995  5  14  19 
1996  1  4  5 
1997  0  8  8 
1998  0  2  2 
1999  0  14  14 
2000  0  8  8 
2001  0  8  8 
2002  0  14  14 
 
 
It was nonetheless sometimes argued that the distribution companies were not given 
sufficient funds, or sufficient incentives or penalties, to propose and support transmission 
expansions to improve quality of supply, or that transmission companies themselves did 
not have a sufficient role in the process. In consequence, it was said, the Public Contest 
method failed to secure investments needed to improve quality and reliability of supply. 
Transmission and distribution companies began to lobby for changes, for example to pass 
through to customers’ end-user tariffs the costs of transmission expansions designed to 
improve quality, so as to allow the development of such expansions.  
 
The Secretary of Energy – now Alfredo Mirkin, who had succeeded Carlos Bastos in 
October 1996 - asked CAMMESA to investigate the basis of such arguments. To that 
end, CAMMESA examined the quality of service on the 500 kV transmission network, 
and reported in late 1997.
6  
 
                                                 
5 Source: Cammesa 
6 “Shortages and Non-supplied Energy”, study by CAMMESA submitted to Secretary of Energy, 21 
October 1997.    7
CAMMESA concluded that two investments were appropriate to improve the quality of 
service on that network. One possible investment was not directly related to transmission, 
but involved a different use of hydro generating facilities.
7 The other proposal was the 
refurbishment of the Northwest corridor as said to be requested by ENRE, and in fact part 
of a long-running story. This was approved and carried out, although arguably it was 
more properly seen as a straightforward project to expand the export capacity of the 
northwest corridor than as a quality of supply expansion. The story is reported here for 
completeness, as an interesting though not typical illustration of the working of the 
expansion mechanism. But the main point to make is that in late 1997 CAMMESA did 
not find any significant lack of investment to maintain or improve quality of supply in the 
500 kV network. 
 
1.2 Reinforcement in the North West 
 
The 500 MW line from Almafuerte up to El Bracho was originally installed in 1987 to 
provide a load flow to meet demand in the northwest. (See Figure 1 below.) But after the 
market developed, it began to appear attractive to install generation in the northwest, and 
to use the line in the opposite direction, south from El Bracho through Almafuerte to 
supply Buenos Aires. In 1994/95 270 MW of gas-fired generation capacity was installed 
in Tucumán, near El Bracho. Then in 1996/97 a natural gas producer Pluspetrol installed 
a further two 140 MW open cycle plants, buying gas from the wellheads just north of 
there. This changed the direction of flow on the line, to about 100 MW south.  
 
In 1998 Pluspetrol wished to install additional generation capacity in Tucumán, by 
closing its open cycles through a steam cycle. But for stability reasons there was a 
constraint on the load flows from the North-West to Buenos Aires that operated jointly 
with load flows from Comahue to Buenos Aires. To meet the constraint, CAMMESA 
decided that it was more economic to reduce generation in the northwest than in 
Comahue, and that the problem would be more severe if new gas fired generators gained 
access. Transener advised that reliability would decrease if the new generation plant were 
built in Tucumán. (Transener’s commercial interest lay in building and/or operating more 
transmission lines to improve such reliability.)  
 
ENRE indicated that, in order to maintain reliability Pluspetrol should pay for certain 
transmission improvements (automatic generation disconnectors). This was not strictly 
within ENRE’s powers: it was an issue between the Tucumán generators themselves, all 
of whom would benefit by being able to export more once this expansion had been made. 
Nevertheless, Pluspetrol found it worthwhile to pay for the transmission expansion, 
which increased capacity by 100 MW at a cost that was relatively small (about $2m) 
compared to the cost of building new generation (estimated $230m). It seems to have 
                                                 
7 The proposal was to use of part of the pumped storage facilities at the government-owned Rio Grande 
power plant to take power instead of supply power in peak hours, so as to provide greater and more 
economic ability to shed load without disconnecting other users. It was calculated that this would provide 
an economical solution to the quality problems claimed by the transmission and distribution companies. 
The government never carried out the project, though the possibility is reportedly still under discussion.   8
proceeded as a Minor Expansion. Later expansions in the same area were done via the 
standard Public Contest method.
8 
 
1.3 Resolution 208 on quality of supply and substation expansions 
 
With the exception of this one exceptional investment that was already under discussion, 
CAMMESA’s investigation did not identify any lack of high-voltage transmission 
investments related to quality and reliability of supply. Nevertheless, to meet any 
concerns, Regulation 208 introduced in May 1998 modified the 1992 Regulations by 
providing two new ways of authorising expansions via the Public Contest method, and by 
allowing a wider variety of persons to propose expansions.
9  
 
To shorten the consultation time needed, Resolution 208 authorised existing transmission 
concessionaires (as well as users/beneficiaries) to initiate a new kind of expansion under 
the title ‘transmission expansions for additional quality and security of supply 
improvement, including Special Expansions’. Special Expansions are those that cannot be 
associated directly with particular lines or substations, and might include (e.g.) power 
stabilisers, automatic generation disconnection, reactive power equipment, etc. The 
concessionaires would make information available in advance for evaluation by all the 
beneficiaries and ENRE. The Secretary of Energy and beneficiaries were given the power 
to propose expansions to provide additional quality and security of supply, on the basis of 
information provided by CAMMESA. CAMMESA’s support was needed for an 
expansion to improve security of supply. ENRE had to be satisfied that the expansions 
were economically beneficial, defined as where the annual charge to cover the cost of 
construction, operation and maintenance of the expansion is less than the expected annual 
reduction in costs of non-supplied energy. (This was a specific way to apply the Golden 
Rule for quality of supply expansions.)
10  
 
With the exception of security of supply expansions, the beneficiaries of quality of 
service expansions would have to vote to approve proposals for expansions.
11 The 
definition of Area of Influence was modified for quality expansions, so that the 
beneficiaries are all those market participants that reduce their expected non-supplied 
energy as a result of the expansion. They participate in the fee according to their expected 
reduction in non-supplied energy in the first two years after the expansion is brought into 
                                                 
8 Transformer and capacitors at Recreo and two 132 kV lines from Recreo, total cost about $23m, accepted 
between September 1998 and January 1999. See Appendix. 
9 SE Resolution 208/ 27 May 1998. 
10 Appendix C to Annex 16 section 2 iii. This last condition applies in Generation zones. Appendix D sets 
out additional conditions for Demand zones, defined as where distribution companies and large users 
constituted more than 70 per cent of the beneficiaries.  Quality of supply expansions may not be obtained, 
either partially or totally, for the purpose of increasing the capacity of the transmission network. 
11 In the special case of security of supply expansions, the decision was a matter for the Secretary of 
Energy, supported by CAMMESA. The total cost would be paid by demand via the capacity payment - a 
charge proportional to peak demand that mainly covered capacity payments to generators.   9




Resolution 208 also enabled the owner of an existing substation to initiate a Public 
Contest expansion process. This must not be carried out as part of any other expansion,
13 
so it will typically be to expand transformer capacity. In addition to information required 
for any Public Contest request, the owner must provide a detailed budget cost breakdown 
into engineering, inspection, materials and installation costs. The owner also has to 
provide technical, economic, reliability, security, transmission capacity and/or system 
response studies. ENRE has to be satisfied that these studies justify taking forward the 
proposal, and that the budgeted operation and maintenance costs are acceptable.  ENRE 
has to inform the beneficiaries of the proposal. With a view to ensuring transparency, 
ENRE must publicise any intention by the transmission company to also participate in the 
tender process for construction, and the beneficiaries have to approve this participation. 
The work is put out to tender. The owner of the substation inspects the installation and is 
remunerated for its reasonable costs in doing so. 
  
Resolution 208 of 1998 thus enabled a wider set of agents - the transmission company, 
the Independent System Operator, the regulator ENRE and the Secretary of Energy, as 
well as the users (beneficiaries) of the network - to propose and approve quality 
expansions of the transmission system, and expansions at existing substations.  For these 
expansions the set of beneficiaries was modified. However, the circumstances under 
which responsibility was transferred were carefully defined, and in other respects the 
mechanism remained as for transmission investments generally. Specifically, the 
beneficiaries had to approve all such expansions, whoever proposed them. The Public 
Contest thus remained the accepted method for dealing with major expansions. 
 
1.4 Implementation of Resolution 208 expansions 
 
The Appendix to the paper sets out the 25 major transmission expansions that have been 
proposed under the Public Contest method. Of these, 8 expansions (covering 10 projects) 
were proposed by transmission concessionaires (3 by Distrocuyo and 5 by Transener) 
under the provisions of Resolution 208. (Minor expansions that may have improved 
quality of supply or related to substations are difficult to identify since ENRE does not 
issue resolutions on them.) 6 of these 8 expansions related to transformers, without 
particular reference to quality of supply. Of these 6 expansions, 1 was accepted without 
difficulty, 3 were accepted but subject to modification or delay (mainly as a result of 
                                                 
12 Automatic generation/compensation disconnection devices should be paid for by the generators in a 
corridor, independently of whether it was an importing or exporting area. Stabilisation devices should be 
paid for by all producers that sell energy in the market, in proportion to their transmission capacity 
payments to Transener. Automatic load disconnection devices should be paid for by producers in the case 
of an exporting area according to the traditional Area of Influence method, and by demanders in the case of 
an importing area according to the same criteria. 
13 Regulations Artículo 16, new para 15 bis et seq   10




The other two of these expansions were quality of supply improvements. The first was a 
reconfiguration of breakers at Ezeiza substation, proposed in 1999 and accepted though 
somewhat delayed.
15 The other was a reserve transformer at Alicurá substation to serve 
Bariloche district. This was proposed in August 2000, opposed at the public hearing in 
May 2001 and finally rejected by ENRE in September 2001. Although this was the only 
quality of supply proposal that was rejected by beneficiaries, some commentators have 
used this example as support for the suggestion that the public contest mechanism does 
not adequately provide for quality expansions because distribution companies cannot or 
do not effectively participate. It is therefore worth exploring this case in more detail as 
part of the discussion of the role of distribution companies in the next section. 
 
1.5 Scope for additional quality expansions 
 
Can it be argued that there was or is a plausible case for further major transmission 
expansions to improve quality and reliability of supply, which for some reason were not 
proposed, either by distribution companies or others? The following calculation attempts 
to identify the most significant potential investment and to compares its benefit against its 
cost. Would it pass the Golden Rule that benefits including reduced value of non-supplied 
energy should exceed costs? 
 
Table 1 showed that the worst year for non-supplied energy in the Argentine system as a 
whole was in 1999, when non-supplied energy rose to 14 GWh. In that year, about 7 
GWh of the 14 GWh total was attributable to failures of generation and high-voltage (500 
kV) transmission lines, mostly the latter.
16  
 
The standard “official value” of non-supplied energy for economic dispatch purposes, 
often used by CAMMESA for Non Supplied Energy cost calculations (i.e. the Golden 
Rule test), is $1500/MWh. On this basis the value of non-supplied energy attributable to 
weaknesses in high-voltage transmission was at most about 7000 MWh x $1500/MWh = 
$10.5 million in 1999.  
 
About half the outages in 1999 were associated with the Comahue – Buenos Aires 
corridor.
17 The most efficient investment to reduce this non-supplied energy would be to 
                                                 
14 Following two proposals in February 2001, the regulator EPRE from Mendoza province claimed that it 
was not adequately involved in the process. ENRE forwarded details and waited for an affirmative response 
to continue, but to date this has not been received. No doubt the economic crisis was relevant here too. 
15 It went to public hearing in December 2001 [reason for delay? check supported by beneficiaries then?] 
but was presumably delayed by the crisis since it was not approved by ENRE until January 2003 and put 
out to tender in January 2004, and is presently under construction. 
16 CAMMESA Annual Report 1999, pp. 80, 85 (Table 2). There was also public concern at the accident in 
the distribution company Edesur’s new substation in February 1999, which produced severe and prolonged 
shortages in Buenos Aires. Those who favoured more transmission investment may have encouraged such 
concern. 
17 Source: internal CAMMESA report.   11
build a Fifth (reliability) Line replicating the previous four lines in this corridor, but used 
only for reliability purposes.
18 The reduction in outages might be valued at say ½ x 
$10.5m = $5 m in 1999. The lower loading would also reduce transmission losses by, 
say, $4m in 1999. This implies a maximum total annual benefit of about $(5 + 4 =) $9m 
in 1999. In other years around that time the benefit would have been much less, perhaps 
of the order of half that amount.  
 
In contrast, the annual cost of the 1300 km Fourth Line was about $35m.
19 On this basis, 
the value of the improved quality and reliability of supply provided by a Fifth (reliability) 
Line from Comahue to Buenos Aires would be at most (in 1999) about one quarter of the 
cost of obtaining it, and in many years only about one eighth. It is difficult to argue that 
such an investment would be economic, or that the Public Contest method had failed in 
not proposing and approving such a reliability line. Moreover, the benefits for other 
reliability lines seem likely to be even lower. 
 
1.6 Conclusion on quality of service 
 
These various developments and calculations do not support concerns and allegations that 
the regulatory framework failed to bring about needed quality and reliability expansions 
of the 500 kV transmission network. Quality of supply improved significantly after 
privatisation. A review by CAMMESA in 1997 found no significant need for projects to 
remedy quality of supply. A modification in 1998 to the original regulatory framework 
allowed transmission companies as well as beneficiaries to propose certain expansions, 
and allowed regulatory authorities to approve other projects. Several such investments 
were proposed and accepted. Calculations suggest that further major expansions designed 
for quality improvement alone would not be economic. In short, the Public Contest 
framework for transmission expansion did not fail to deliver economically worthwhile 
investments to improve the quality or reliability of the Argentine high voltage 
transmission system.  
 
There may, however, be scope for clarifying the role of distribution companies and the 
attitudes of provincial governments, as now examined. 
 
 
2.  Distribution companies 
 
2.1 Role of distribution companies 
 
The initial Regulations
20 envisaged that distribution companies as well as generators 
would play their part in promoting new investment in the transmission system. 
                                                 
18 This line would not avoid the cost of any double faults, nor would it relieve congestion. The 5 lines could 
each be run at 4/5 capacity but in order to preserve their reliability property in the event of one failing they 
could not exceed such loading. 
19 Winning bid $24.5m plus annualised equivalent of $80m Salex, say $10.5m. 
20 Market Regulations Annex 16 per Resolution SE 137 (30 November 1992), in force from February 1993. 
There were some revisions subsequently e.g. the creation of Salex Accounts by SE 274/1994.   12
Distribution companies would have obligations to achieve and maintain specified 
qualities of service, with penalties in the event that they failed to do so. In important 
respects they could maintain or improve the quality of service by means of investments in 
the transmission and sub-transmission networks as well as in their own distribution 
networks. Distribution companies would therefore have an incentive to initiate and/or 
support such investment, insofar as it was the most economic means to meet their quality 
performance standards. In fact, there was some expectation that the distribution 
companies, especially the three national concessionaires
21, would take the lead in 
proposing such expansions. 
  
Some critics say that the system did not work as planned, and that distribution companies 
did not propose or support transmission expansions to the extent envisaged. Some say 
that the distribution companies were not given sufficient funds, or sufficient incentives or 
penalties, to propose and support such transmission expansions. In consequence, it is 
said, the Public Contest method failed to secure investments needed to improve quality 
and reliability of supply.  
 
However, there has not been any extensive examination of the attitudes that distribution 
companies did take on expansion issues, or of the reasons for their stance, and it seems 
likely that the situation varied according to the type of distribution company. In 
consequence, it is a matter of dispute whether the outcome reflects some intrinsic failure 
in the Public Contest method for this type of investment, or whether such problems as did 
arise were attributable to inadequacies in the setting or enforcing of penalties or in the 
provision of funds. 
 
The next two sub-sections examine in more detail the nature of the penalty regime on the 
transmission and distribution companies. Subsequent sections look at the widely cited 
example concerned Bariloche, and at more recent developments involving distribution 
companies and provincial governments.  
 
2.2 The role of penalties 
Transener and other transmission companies were subject to penalties for failures on their 
own grids. These penalties were proportionate to the tariffs for capacity and connection 
charges, and proportionate to the number of hours during which the line or transformer 
was unavailable. Penalties paid by Transener and other transmission companies were then 
distributed amongst all market participants, including generators, distribution companies 
and large users, in proportion to their payments of transmission capacity charges and 
connection charges associated with the line or transformer that failed.  
 
Similarly, distribution companies were subject to penalties for failures on their own 
grids.
22 However, whether they were held responsible for failures on transmission grids, 
                                                 
21 Edenor, Edesur and Edelap in the Buenos Aires area, formed out of the national company SEGBA. 
22 The most notable case is that in 1999 Edesur paid $80 m for a severe fault in its own 132 kV grid. This 
comprised $51m penalty by ENRE (higher than the norm for the loss of supply involved) plus $20m in 
compensations agreed directly with customers plus $9m resulting from later judicial decisions. Source:   13
and what they did with any penalty payments they received from transmission 
companies, varied according to the type of distribution company. There are three main 
categories of these:  
-  the Federal concessions (Edenor, Edesur and Edelap, privatised successor 
companies of the federal company SEGBA), which accounted for about 60 per 
cent of energy distributed in the country, 
-  the provincial concessions put into private ownership (in about half of the 
provinces, including Buenos Aires province), and 
-  the distribution companies remaining in provincial government ownership (in the 
other half of the provinces). 
 
In the case of the Federal concessions, penalties paid by Transener to the distribution 
company were retained rather than passed on to end-users (consumers). However, the 
Federal distribution companies were also subject to penalties for Non-Supplied Energy 
due to failures in the external transmission grids.
23 These penalties were embodied in the 
concession contracts and enforced by ENRE. The aim was to provide a net incentive on 
these distribution companies to support new transmission investment. Some of these 
distribution companies complained that they had not been provided with funds to support 
transmission expansions. A contrary view was that the purchasers of distribution 
companies were aware of their obligations to meet quality standards.  If transmission 
investments were the most economic way to achieve the specified standards and avoid 
the concomitant penalties, bidders should have factored the possibility and cost of 
supporting transmission investments into their bids for the distribution companies. 
 
It had therefore been expected that the Federal distribution companies (at least) would be 
active players in the expansion of the transmission grid. They would contract ahead for 
new generation, and/or for generation and transmission, and to this end would promote 
transmission expansions where necessary.
24 In the event, their incentive to contract for 
generation gradually disappeared,
25 and was not insisted upon. Within a few years the 
notion that these distribution companies should consider supporting transmission 
expansions in order to meet their quality of service obligations had also (and 
conveniently for them) been forgotten. 
 
In the case of the privatised provincial distribution companies, arrangements vary. 
Buenos Aires province has a mechanism whereby the distribution company is held 
responsible for non-supplied energy due to transmission failures, but penalties paid by 
                                                                                                                                                 
Edesur Balance and Accounts 1999, p. 44.For further discussion, see Santiago Urbiztondo, “El ‘Apagón de 
Edesur’ ”, FIEL/DE-UNLP, Preliminary version, April 2003. 
23 This was also the case with distribution companies acting in the role of transmission companies for large 
consumers buying directly in the market. 
24 This would be a matter of commercial profitability, not a legal or licence obligation. Although some 
other countries envisaged that there would be a formal obligation on the distribution companies to enter 
into contracts for a minimum percentage of their demand, Secretary of Energy Bastos considered that an 
obligation to contract was inconsistent with a competitive market. 
25 Spot market prices continued to fall to such an extent that distribution companies found long-term 
contracting unattractive. Prices of $50/MWh had been envisaged at the time of privatisation, but within a 
few years spot prices were down to $30 and even $20/MWh.   14
Transener have to be passed through to end-users. In contrast, the distribution company 
Edersa in Río Negro province is also required to pass transmission penalties through to 
end-users but is not held responsible for failures by the transmission companies.  
 
Where distribution companies were not held responsible for failures in the transmission 
system, there was no particular incentive on them to support new transmission 
investment. Where in principle they were held responsible for failures in the transmission 
system, there might have been such an incentive, but they complained if the tariffs did 
not make explicit arrangement for transmission investment, hence argued that there could 
be no such obligation.
26 
 
In the case of the distribution companies remaining in provincial ownership (e.g. in 
Neuquén province), they typically retain penalty payments paid by Transener and other 
transmission companies, and are typically not required to make penalty payments for 
failures by these transmission companies. Their incentive to support transmission 
expansions is unclear. 
 
Table 2 represents these cases in terms of a 2 x 2 matrix, with examples in all four cells. 
 
Table 2 Responsibilities and obligations of distribution companies  
 
  Responsible for 
transmission failures 





(Edenor, Edesur, Edelap) 
Provincially owned  
(e.g. Neuquén)  
Not retain transmission 
penalties 
Some provincial 
concessions (e.g. BA) 
Some provincial 
concessions (eg. Río Negro) 
 
 
Resolution 208 modified the Area of Influence method so that the total cost of quality 
expansions was allocated to the buyers (distribution companies and large customers). But 
it said nothing about passing these costs to end-user tariffs. It tried to make it clear that 
distribution companies would have to pay for transmission quality improvements 
according to their existing responsibilities. Some distribution companies tried to argue 
that they did not have responsibilities here. The only expansions where costs could be 
passed directly through to end-users were security expansions.
27  
                                                 
26 In Buenos Aires province, for example, the pass-through arrangements for the successor distribution 
companies to ESEBA (EDEN, EDEA and EDES) made allowance only for transmission charges as they 
applied at the date of privatisation. This was argued to imply that the costs of subsequent expansions were 
not to be passed through to customers. Neither did the price control formula for calculating the Value 
Added in Distribution make any mention of an element to pay for such expansions.  Distribution companies 
typically took the view that the lack of provision in tariffs for transmission expansion made it virtually 
impossible to propose or support any such expansion. Interestingly, the other quality of supply expansion 
that was approved (at Ezeiza) involved the cost passed to end users tariff of the Distribution Companies of 
Buenos Aires (the beneficiaries). 
27 Costs of security expansions were included in the capacity charge, which the concession contracts made 
provision for including in the end-user tariffs.   15
 
It was open to provincial governments, who effectively regulated the non-Federal 
distribution companies, to resolve this issue if they considered that the implicit 
obligations were unclear or insufficient. They could have allowed the pass through of 
transmission expansion costs, or made some other allowance for such expenditure. In the 
event, most provinces were reluctant to do so.  
 
2.3 Penalties and role of ENRE 
 
It has been suggested that ENRE and the provincial governments either reduced or did 
not always enforce the system of penalties for non-supplied energy as originally intended, 
and that this reduced or removed the incentive of distribution companies
 to support new 
transmission investment. As with funding and obligations to support transmission 
expansions, the situation is similarly varied from one jurisdiction to another, but it is 
possible to say something about ENRE’s role. ENRE was responsible for regulating 
transmission companies and the Federal concessions (Edenor and Edesur in Buenos Aires 
and Edelap in La Plata).
28  
 
The concession contracts for the federal distribution companies specified from the 
beginning the following schedule of penalties. After an initial one-year trial period, the 
penalty for non-supplied energy would be $1000/MWh for the next three years. From the 
beginning of the fifth year of the concession period, penalty rates would be increased, to 
$1400/MWh for users of up to 10kW maximum demand, $2300/MWh for users between 
10 kW and 50 kW, and $2700/MWh for users over 50 kW.  
 
In practice, matters were not quite so clear-cut. Shortages were only penalised if they 
exceeded a specified cap value for each transformer centre to low voltage networks, 
regardless of whether the shortages were caused within the distribution grid itself or by 
an external transmission grid. In addition, non-supplied energy due to maintenance is not 
computed.  
 
ENRE was responsible for the methodology for measuring and controlling shortages. It 
engaged in discussions with distribution companies about this. The combined net effect 
of the penalty rates and enforcement provisions is not entirely clear. However, it seems 
that the implementation of the new methodology from the fifth year onwards offset the 
impact of the increased penalty rates. It has been calculated that total penalty payments 
divided by total non-supplied energy averaged about $300/MWh in the first three year 
period after the trial year, and reduced to about $150/MWh after 1997.
29 Arguably this is 
too weak a signal to encourage expansions on the transmission grid. Since the penalty 
rates themselves increased, this suggests that ENRE’s interpretation of the methodology 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
28 As noted, ENRE’s regulatory responsibilities also extended to other distribution companies acting as 
transmission providers to large users that had decided to buy in the market. Allowing large users to 
participate in the market increased competition and enabled them to protect themselves against excessive 
prices. It was also a tool to drive Federal reform policy into the provinces even where provincial 
governments were opposed to reform. 
29 Source: calculation by R Sanz while at CAMMESA.   16
for measuring and penalising shortages reduced the incentives of the federal distribution 
companies to participate transmission expansions. 
 
2.4 Reserve transformer in Bariloche
30 
 
In August 2000 Transener requested an expansion of capacity at its Alicurá substation, in 
the form of a supplementary transformer for use as cold reserve. The company explained 
that this proposal arose from the lack of alternative means of supplying two towns (San 
Carlos de Bariloche in Río Negro Province and San Martin de los Andes in Neuquén 
Province) in the event of an outage of the single transformer at Alicurá. ENRE held a 
public audience on 31 May 2001. Transener put forward two possible solutions (differing 
only in the configuration of the bus bar expansion at the substation). One would cost 
$8.8m, the other $6.2m, though Transener hoped to reduce these costs. At 15% interest 
and amortised over five years, the annual fees would be $2.5m and $1.7m respectively.  
 
The provincial regulator from Río Negro Province claimed that neither solution satisfied 
the Golden Rule requiring that system costs should be lower with the investment than 
without it.
31 This regulator said that it had obligations to maintain security of supply, 
recognised the problem identified by Transener, and agreed that an investment was 
needed to guarantee security of supply to users. However, the provincial regulator would 
not allow the distribution company to pass through to users the cost of the alternatives 
proposed by Transener. Nevertheless, recognising the need for investment, it offered an 
alternative that would meet the Golden Rule and maintain quality of supply. This was to 
move to Alicurá a moveable reserve transformer, then based at Puelches substation, 
which together with some improvements at the substation would cost about $0.97 million 
in total. It was implied that the cost of this could be passed through to users. 
 
The identified beneficiaries were the distribution companies EDERSA from Río Negro 
Province (a privatised company) and EPEN from Neuquén Province (still owned by the 
Province). Their voting shares as beneficiaries were about 75% and 25% respectively. 
EDERSA noted that Transener stood to gain from this expansion, even though it was 
investing nothing, since the expansion would reduce the risk of penalties to which 
Transener was exposed. EDERSA’s concession contract specifying the basis of its tariffs 
took into account its investment in its own grid, but made no mention of investments in 
the transmission network, and made provision for passing through any penalties deriving 
from failures in the transmission and sub-transmission networks. It followed that this 
expansion had no economic benefit for EDERSA.
32  
 
                                                 
30 ENRE Public Audience 31 May 2001; Resolution ENRE 0501/ 14 September 2001. 
31 Calculations were reportedly shown in a power point presentation at the public hearing but were not 
included in the transcript. 
32 Interestingly, the town of Bariloche was served by a municipal cooperative that accounted for 70 of the 
75 per cent share of EDERSA in the project, but since the cooperative was supplied by EDERSA it had no 
vote of its own.    17
Transener rejected the provincial regulator’s proposed alternative investment as 
technically infeasible, without giving further detail.
33 As regards the argument of the 
distribution company about not being able to pass through its costs, Transener said that 
responsibility for supply was precisely the signal for distribution companies to support 
investments in the transmission system. 
34 It was true that Transener would be penalised 
for substandard performance in the absence of the expansion, but the more important 
issue was the quality of service for customers.   
 
Since the opposition to the proposed expansion exceeded 30 per cent, ENRE declared the 
proposal rejected. Formally, both distribution companies voted against it. But it seems 
that it was ultimately the provincial regulators, rather than the distribution companies, 
that prevented the proposed expansion. Whether there was a genuine difference of view 
on the technical issue of the adequacy of the moveable transformer, or whether the 
provincial regulator genuinely considered that the cost involved exceeded the value of the 
extra reliability, is unclear.  
 
Some have conjectured that the provincial regulator was ultimately looking to persuade 
the federal government to pay for the needed expansion rather than provincial customers. 
Reliability conditions in Bariloche were certainly a matter of wider concern since 
Bariloche is an important tourist centre in Argentina. If this aim was indeed in mind, it 
eventually succeeded. When the Secretary of Energy announced an Upgrade Expansion 
programme in 2003 (see below), to be paid for mainly by users generally, the originally 
proposed scheme in Bariloche (now costing $9 m) emerged at the top of the list.
 35 
 
2.5 Transmission expansions involving distribution companies and provinces 
 
The problems posed by distribution companies may have been overestimated. Of the 
eight expansions (covering ten projects) proposed under Resolution 208, only one 
(Alicurá transformer for Bariloche) was rejected, and that was because the relevant 
provincial regulators made it clear that they were opposed to the expansion. The others 
were passed by a 100% vote in seven cases. In the remaining two cases the only objector 
                                                 
33 Transener said only that the risk of outage that it assumed during the long time needed to move a 
transformer from Puelches (or from another substation at Choele Choel) to Alicurá was a matter for its own 
decision. 
34 Any penalty incurred by Transener is paid to the affected market participants, including distribution 
companies. The issue is whether they pass it on to end-users. The federal successor companies (Edenor, 
Edesur and Edelap) were not required to pass the penalty payments to end-users, but at the same time they 
were held fully responsible for any failures on the part of the transmission companies. In the case of Río 
Negro, penalty payments from Transener are refunded directly to end-users, but the distribution company is 
not responsible for failures on the part of transmission companies. As a consequence, there is a lack of 
incentive for such distribution companies to improve the transmission grids.) Transener may thus have had 
the Federal concessions in mind, perhaps as an ideal, and failed to appreciate or acknowledge the role of 
the provincial regulators in setting quality of service targets and penalties for their distribution companies. 
35 When Transener presented the Alicurá proposal to the public hearing, it mentioned that it had also 
proposed additional transformers for Campana, Ramallo and Henderson substations. The first two 
proposals had been accepted at public hearings. However, the relevant distribution company EDEN had 
rejected the expansion at Henderson substation, and this proposal seems to have been aborted without 
coming to a public hearing. The Henderson proposal too was accepted under the Upgrade scheme.   18
was one large consumer, accounting for only 6.9% of the votes in one case and 3.2% in 
the other. With the exception of the Alicurá/Bariloche case, distribution companies both 
privately owned and provincial-owned, cooperatives, and other large consumers all voted 
in support of the expansions. The number of voters varied: one in three cases, two in 
three cases, three in two cases, eight in one case and ten in one case. Distribution 
companies in several jurisdictions, including Mendoza, Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Cordoba 
and San Luis, plus the Federal jurisdiction, supported the expansions. The distribution 
companies involved seem to come from all of the cells in Table 1, with the possible 
exception of companies not responsible for transmission failures and not retaining any 
penalties paid for such failures. 
 
The distribution company of San Juan Province (Energía San Juan or ESJ) promoted a 
second circuit at 220 kV to increase capacity of supply from Mendoza. It put up two 
alternatives, with different starting points. One was opposed by 45% of votes (opponents 
being a thermal generator in Mendoza and a large user in San Juan Province). The other 
was opposed by 47% of votes (opponents being the distribution company in Mendoza, 
the same large user and another large user). Thus, although named as beneficiaries, these 
generators and large users did not need the line. In addition, the provincial regulators of 
San Juan, Mendoza and neighbouring La Rioja province sent notes to ENRE pointing out 
that the government was proposing to support a 500 kV line between the same points.
36  
 
Some economists explored the possibility of a new mechanism to augment the federal 
Public Contest method, using the same idea of coalitions of beneficiaries.
 37 A simplified 
version of this idea was taken up by the distribution companies in Buenos Aires province 
so as to maintain and improve the quality of supply in that province, within the general 
framework of transmission expansion and the Public Contest method.
38 Experience to 
date is encouraging, and confirms that getting agreement between users is not an obstacle 
to this kind of approach. Other provinces are reportedly considering following Buenos 
Aires in this respect.  
 
Some provinces are beginning to accept the notion that the cost of desired improvements 
in quality and reliability should be passed through to customers. For example, the 
regulator in San Juan province seems to have perceived a danger that continuing delays in 
                                                 
36 Resolution SE 665/1999 was in force under which the government proposed to support the Mining Line 
financed by the Federal Transmission Fund (see below). Existing Federal funding (see below) was already 
supporting construction of 132 kV lines: some 2705 km of new 132 kV lines were constructed in the sub-
transmission systems over the period 1992 to 2002. Source: CAMMESA Annual Report 2002. 
37 “This mechanism is based on the competitive selection of projects that are financed through an escrow 
fund created by regional network users. Coalitions of future beneficiaries reveal their preferences through a 
cost/benefit ratio, which is the criterion to rank and approve projects. This mechanism presents several 
advantages over existing procedures: it promotes self-revelation of beneficiaries, avoiding centralized 
administrative discretion; it alleviates the free-riding problem; and it does not require ex-post auditing of 
actual path flows.” Abdala and Chambouleyron 1999, Abstract.  
38 There is a well-organised framework, an agreed Ten Year plan of investment, and a cooperative spirit 
between transmission and distribution companies, municipal cooperatives, and the provincial government. 
The national economic crisis has been a problem, but initial funds are now available, and a coordinated 
programme transmission expansion is underway in the 500 kV and 132 kV systems, including the Olavarría 
– Barker 132 kV line in 2001. See Littlechild and Ponzano 2004.   19
the Mining Line (see below) could have an adverse impact on quality of supply in that 
province. In June 2004 it announced that cost of the prospective 500 kV line to Mendoza 
(the first section of the Mining line) would be passed through to users with a view to 
partially financing the first part of the Mining Line, at the same time asking for Federal 
Council support as discussed below. 
 
Argentine experience does not suggest a serious failure of the mechanism for 
transmission expansion as regards the participation of the distribution companies. The 
problem seems to lie more with the stance of some provincial governments. In some 
cases, ambiguities or weaknesses in the regulatory framework for distribution companies 
may have reduced or removed the means or the incentive for them to participate. But the 
actual participation of distribution companies in many transmission expansions suggests 
that the Public Contest method itself was not defective. Some provinces are now taking 
forward developments within that framework. It would be more accurate to say that the 
original scheme was not fully applied in certain respects, than that it was applied and had 
failed.  
 
3.  Second round of reforms 
 
3.1 Reviewing the market  
 
Reform of the electricity sector had been designed and implemented under Carlos Bastos, 
Secretary of Energy 1992-1996, and Domingo Cavallo, Minister of Economy. Their 
successors Alfredo Mirkin and Roque Fernandez decided to take stock of the situation 
five years after the initial reform, with a view to a possible second round of reforms. In 
March 1997 Mirkin commissioned a review by consultants NERA.
39  
 
The commissioning of the review should not be seen as an indication that the 
Government had concluded that the user-oriented transmission expansion mechanism had 
failed and needed to be replaced.
40 The scope of the review was wide-ranging, covering 
six major topics.
41 Transmission expansion was by no means the Government’s only or 
major concern: transmission and distribution combined were only part of one of these six 
                                                 
39 The authors of the NERA report were Kent Anderson, Sally Hunt, Hethie Parmesano, Graham 
Shuttleworth and Stephen Powell. 
40 Some accounts may be read as suggesting this. E.g. “Once the fourth line was approved, however, the 
government began to search for alternative mechanisms for identifying and financing transmission 
expansion projects. The government and others in the industry believed that there were other worthwhile 
transmission improvements besides the fourth line…. The government feared that the combination of 
voting and the surplus fund accounts might not provide the proper incentives for transmission 
improvements.” Gómez-Ibáñez, 2003, pp. 316-317.   
41 “Price signals in the Wholesale Power Market (MEM) in Argentina; Development of the contract market 
and its role in the quality of supply; The systems of commercialisation that are currently in place, and those 
that might be developed for the future; The coherence of regulations governing the different players, with 
special emphasis on the transmission and distribution of electricity; The mechanism for setting costs and 
prices in the distribution concessions; and The relationship of the Electricity Sector to Gas and 
Hydrocarbons Markets.” NERA 1998, p. 3    20
topics. Moreover, the Government made clear that the aim was to extend the 
‘deregulated’ or market approach, not to limit or replace it.
42  
 
NERA’s report in January 1998 complimented the highly sophisticated ‘state of the art’ 
design of the Argentine system. It commented that “on the whole the results have been 




NERA noted that “transmission expansion is the major problem we have found in the 
system”. But even here the concern was qualified: the delayed Fourth Line did get built 
and there was no internationally agreed best solution to the transmission expansion 
problem.
44 Four major distortions related to transmission expansion were identified.
45 
The two most problematic features were “the absence of transmission rights and the use 
of the Area of Influence method to assign responsibility for payment”. Of these, NERA 
considered the former the most fundamental, and recommended the introduction of 
transmission rights. But NERA did not recommend the abolition of, or changes to, the 
Area of Influence method.
46 
 
After further analysis, the Government introduced further reforms in October 1999 in 
almost all aspects of the electricity sector. These were embodied in Resolution 543 on 
transmission and Resolution 545 on all other aspects of the sector
47.  
 
Resolution 543 (discussed in the next three sections) addressed the outstanding 
transmission issues, especially financial transmission rights that NERA proposed, and it 
introduced a novel concept of ‘risk-bearing expansion’. Resolution 545 covered a wide 
variety of areas and extended to 486 pages. Its main aim was two-fold: to make the 
                                                 
42 The terms of reference stated “The main output of this project should permit a deepening of the current 
wholesale power market in Argentina, as well as the implementation of certain de-regulating mechanisms 
that will facilitate easier and more efficient transactions in this market.” NERA 1998, p. 3. 
43 NERA 1998 p. 3 
44 “The only major problem has been the delay in constructing the fourth transmission line; but despite the 
problems encountered in getting agreement to build the line, the line was successfully put out to bid in 
1997.” (p. 3). “Transmission expansion is one of the most difficult analytical problems, and every 
competitive system has a different method for dealing with it. No country has developed a system that is 
agreed to be state of the art.” (p. 11) 
45 NERA 1998, p. 11. “We believe that the current system gives rise to four major distortions. They work in 
different directions, some encouraging building and some discouraging it. In any particular case the 
outcome depends on the mix of factors. The four distortions … are as follows: 
The generators may not be willing to pay for economic lines until long after they should have been started. 
The use of the Salex fund may encourage uneconomic construction of transmission. 
Generators may have an over-incentive to commit funds to expansion (which might offset the first 
distortion in some cases, but cannot be assumed to do so). 
The combination of these factors may encourage uneconomic location decisions.” NERA 1998, p. 55. 
46 This was not because NERA wished to limit the extent of change. It made recommendations for 
significant change in the other areas examined, notably to eliminate bidding restrictions and the peak 
capacity payment, increase the scope for demand bidding, encourage the development of a standardised 
forward contracts market, reduce contract restrictions, and increase retail access. 
47 Respectively Resolutions SE 543/1999, 19 October 1999, and SE 545/1999, 21 October 1999.   21
market for energy more competitive by reducing restrictions on bidding
48 and reforming 
capacity payments, and to encourage markets for reserves (such as ancillary services, 
short- and long-term reserves and frequency regulation, and enabling demand-side 
involvement etc.) These two resolutions were explicitly designed to refine and develop 
the existing market-oriented arrangements, not to withdraw or replace them.  
 
3.2 The Area of Influence method: initial thinking 
 
The main concerns about the Public Contest method have been that the associated Area 
of Influence method allocated votes in proportion to use of the line rather than in 
proportion to economic benefit, and that this effectively disenfranchised the distribution 
companies and large customers in Buenos Aires. These concerns were expressed by 
several commentators, analysed in some detail, and much repeated.
49 It is therefore 
interesting to examine what the designers of the Area of Influence method had in mind.  
 
A criterion based on use rather than benefit reduced the extent of subjectivity required to 
apply the method. Use could be observed, recorded and verified, at least historically. 
Economic benefit was a broader and not directly observable concept, and likely to be the 
subject of more dispute.
50  The rules as specified made the process workable and the 
calculations relatively immune to political pressures.  
 
Use rather than benefit also meant that CAMMESA’s model of the system, the most 
developed model available at the time, could be used to calculate votes. This obviated the 
need to negotiate what method of benefit measurement to use, which would have been 
time-consuming and perhaps inconclusive. Some have suggested that the voting rules 
should accurately reflect benefits.
51 This was certainly a consideration, but the more 
practical criterion was whether the rules were sufficiently accurate for their purpose.   
 
                                                 
48 For the most part, generators had to submit their variable costs six months ahead. It was proposed to 
reduce this to one week. Over time, it was hoped to reduce this further, and thereby gradually to migrate to 
daily (or hourly or more even more frequent) bidding. This would still be based on variable costs, but the 
idea was to reach a point were it would be easy to change to a free (unrestricted) bidding system in the 
future. 
49 “A key problem of the Area of Influence method is that it does not in fact identify beneficiaries or 
accurately measure users’ share of benefits.” NERA 1998, p. 70. See also references in Part One of this 
paper. Most of the later commentators reference the research by Chisari et al 2001. These authors use 
examples from a simulation model to identify flaws in that mechanism. In summary, the suggested flaws 
are the exclusion of consumers from the mechanism, the exclusion of market participants in the ‘swing 
bus’, the assignation of votes and fees based on usage rather than profit, and the possibility of strategic 
vetoes on expansion. (p. 713) 
50 It is presumably for similar reasons that, in the market economy generally, goods and services are 
normally produced and sold according to usage rather than benefit.  
51 E.g. Chisari et al 2001. “Voting was less burdensome than a negotiated agreement. But voting also 
placed a premium on the accuracy of the rules for measuring how much different parties would benefit 
from the line, and thus how many votes they had.” Gómez-Ibáñez 2003, p. 313..   22
The original requirement that beneficiaries should be in a defined influence area was an 
attempt to limit the range, subjectivity and manipulability of the calculations.
52 In 
addition, a defined influence area meant that negotiation was confined to a relatively 
small and manageable subset of all the parties that might claim in principle to have an 
interest in a particular project. Thus, for example, application of the rules in the case of 
the Fourth Line identified 17 parties in the influence area, compared to some forty 
generators, two dozen distribution companies, and over a thousand large users in the 
electricity system as a whole. This surely reduced transactions costs.
53 
 
The concern about customers and distribution companies in Buenos Aires being 
disenfranchised follows from the choice of Buenos Aires as the reference node. The 
thinking of the transmission privatisation team on this issue, when it came in 1993 to 
flesh out the general rules laid down in the general framework of 1991, was as follows.
54  
1)  In 1991 it was decided to use Ezeiza as the reference node for calculating 
marginal price.
55 (Ezeiza was the main 500 kV node near Buenos Aires, which 
area accounted for about 60 per cent of national demand, although choice of node 
was unimportant for this particular purpose.) There needed to be a good reason to 
choose a node other than Ezeiza for calculations using the Area of Influence 
method in applying the Public Contest method. 
2)  The main investment decisions for the foreseeable future would not be whether or 
when to build new generation to meet increasing demand in Buenos Aires, but 
rather where to build it.  Specifically the choice was whether to generate 
electricity in Comahue and transport it to Buenos Aires or whether to transport 
gas from Comahue to Buenos Aires and generate electricity there. This had two 
implications.   
-  First, if new generation would be built at about the same time anyway, then prices 
would fall anyway, and consumers would be broadly indifferent as to where the 
generation was located and whether a new transmission line was built. Location 
would be a matter for generators. So the ability of consumers and distribution 
companies to vote in this matter was not crucial.  
                                                 
52 “We were wary of the unqualified terms ‘benefits’ and ‘beneficiaries’ since we did not know how they 
would be interpreted. By specifying an area of influence we hoped to tie down the calculation to something 
more tangible.” (R Sanz, personal communication, April 2004). 
53 The rules for expansion also reduced transactions costs in other ways. For example, the rules for Contract 
Between Parties, Minor Expansions and dedicated facilities (Article 31) enabled those projects to go ahead 
with minimal restrictions. 170 such projects worth nearly $300m were approved from 1994 to 2002 (see 
below). Similarly, the provision that 30 per cent of the votes were needed to block a project (rather than 70 
per cent required to approve it) meant that parties who were relatively indifferent to an expansion were not 
required to vote to support it. (See Gómez-Ibáñez 2003, p. 314.) Parties with relatively minor interests at 
stake could not overrule a project that was in the substantial interest of the majority.  
54 R Sanz, personal communication, April 2004 
55 Resolution SEE 38/1991 set the initial market regulations as guidelines to implement economic 
transactions among state-owned utilities. The National Load Dispatch Centre (DNC), forerunner of 
CAMMESA until September 1992, had used Ezeiza as the load centre of the system in calculating marginal 
costs. Resolution SEE 61/1992 extended and improved (and also derogated) SEE 38/ 1991, providing more 
detailed rules and prepared the market for private participation. It explicitly set Ezeiza 500 kV substation as 
the Market Node.   23
-  Second, there was no provision for electricity distribution companies to contribute 
explicitly to the cost of building gas pipelines to Buenos Aires to be used to 
generate electricity there, so would it be sensible to make them contribute 
explicitly to the cost of building electricity transmission lines for electricity 
generated in Comahue? It was important not to distort the main investment 
decisions.
56 
3)  A consideration was which parties could take investment decisions quickly. The 
private generators could, and indeed had done so historically as part of the former 
integrated generation and transmission companies AyE and Hidronor. In contrast, 
distribution companies did not previously have a part in the decision process on 
transmission, were not all privatised, and were subject to regulatory limitations 
and delays. If, to overcome this, a distribution company were to be allowed to 
transfer the additional cost of this transmission investment to customers, then a 
regulatory approval process would have to be specified in the rules, and might 
take time to implement. 
4)  Distribution companies were in any case imperfect representatives of electricity 
customers. They were effectively part of the regulated or “planned” sector of the 
electricity industry, whereas generation companies were part of the market sector. 
Deliberately to provide a larger role for distribution companies meant reducing or 
compromising the extension of the market sector to transmission expansion. 
 
In light of these considerations, there did not seem a sufficiently strong reason in 1992 to 
require that the Public Contest method should try to invent a new model based on benefit 
when a workable method based on usage was to hand. Nor did it seem sensible to require 
the Area of Influence method to use a node other than Ezeiza in order to give a higher 
vote to Buenos Aires distribution companies.  
 
The transmission privatisation team was conscious that the rules might not be suitable for 
all future circumstances (including if and when the network became meshed rather than 
radial). However, they also knew that if appropriate it would be possible to revise the 
rules in the light of experience, and to meet changing circumstances.
57 They were 
designing rules to meet the main issues of the then-foreseeable future, within the context 
of a flexible framework that allowed revision as and when proved necessary. 
 
                                                 
56 It is arguable that, in a fully adjusted competitive market, consumers in Buenos Aires would pay the full 
cost of electricity generation wherever generated, since the gas and electricity prices would adequately 
reflect the costs involved. On this view, if the electricity distribution companies did not contribute 
explicitly to the cost of the transmission expansion, consumers would pay for it via the bid price of the 
generators. Various restrictions in the Argentine arrangements, and the lack of initial adjustment, meant 
that prices were not fully cost-reflective in this way. 
57 With recent and prospective lines increasing the meshed nature of the grid, it is important to consider 
whether the Area of Influence method needs to be changed. One possibility is to continue with it subject to 
constraints on the extent to which market participants in areas distant from an expansion should be deemed 
beneficiaries. Interestingly, initial studies suggest that the problems of a meshed system may not be so 
much that the Area of Influence method fails to identify some users of a potential expansion (like the 
Buenos Aires distribution companies), but that it identifies as users parties from implausibly distant parts of 
the system. For example, Yacyretá in the North-East might be identified as a user of the potential 
Comahue-Cuyo line in the South-West.   24
3.3 The Area of Influence method: subsequent thinking 
 
There were obviously opportunities to revise the transmission expansion rules later, and 
many parties urged this, not least ENRE and various economists. It is worth noting, 
however, that even some who have been most critical of the weaknesses of the Public 
Contest method do not suggest changing the approach to the more conventional regulated 
transmission model. They look to improvements in the use of the Public Contest and 
Area of Influence models rather than to their abolition.
58 
 
In the event, when the review of the electricity reforms took place, neither NERA nor the 
Secretary of Energy deemed changes to the Area of Influence model to be necessary, 
whereas significant other changes were in fact made. In fact, the Area of Influence 
method was not even mentioned as an issue. Why was this? One reason (reinforced in 
this paper) is that, despite the theoretical criticisms, it was not clear that any economic 
transmission expansions had been frustrated by the Area of Influence model, nor any 
uneconomic expansions artificially stimulated by them. A second reason is that there was 
no pressure for change from market participants themselves. They were accustomed to 
the Area of Influence model being used to determine the allocation of costs on a daily 
basis in the generation dispatch system. 
 
A third reason is that no convincingly superior alternatives had been put forward. This 
was evidently the conclusion that NERA reached. It listed several alternatives to the Area 
of Influence method, but pointed out that each of these alternatives had drawbacks, and it 
could not find a better method.
 59In the view of several commentators this is still the 
situation today.
60 
                                                 
58 “We still maintain that the problems with the present system are basically those summarized from our 
paper. We think the system can be improved, not necessarily abolished; some of the corrections are purely 
technical. Exclusion of consumers and markets participants in the ‘swing bus’: this is just a matter of 
correcting the present mechanism (to include Buenos Aires). We think that if those gains had been 
computed earlier, the fourth line would have been constructed some years before it was. Assignation of 
votes and fees based on usage rather than profits: again, this can be corrected with a good estimate of true 
economic incentives (or perhaps including the ‘swing bus’ in the calculations is enough as a proxy for 
economic incentives). Strategic vetoes:  this problem can be addressed from the perspective of competition 
policy.  The same problem would be present in several other mechanisms. However, there are problems 
that influence transmission investments but that are not intrinsic to the decision methodology. On the one 
hand, Distribution Companies under the present tariff regulation (full pass-through of cost of energy to 
customers) do not have the incentive to look for better prices or to establish contracts with generators and 
therefore to invest in transmission. On the other hand, uncertainty and lack of agreement about the growth 
of demand, investment indivisibilities and capital market imperfections tend to delay investments. 
Transmission rights do not seem to be a solution. Those same problems of imperfections in capital markets 
justify our scepticism on physical or financial rights to foster investments. The present mechanism, 
corrected, can get the same results without paying the costs of dealing with a new market of uncertain 
efficiency and competition policy problems (in a “small numbers” economy). Of course, several of these 
issues deserve more discussion and research.”  Omar O. Chisari and Carlos A. Romero, personal 
communication, 9 June 2003 (abbreviated with the agreement of the authors). 
59 “Alternatives to the Area of Influence method include methods that allocate costs by: estimated benefits, 
MW capacity or demand, MW-distance, or MWh output or usage. Like the Area of Influence method, each 
of these methods has drawbacks. Most of the methods are also somewhat arbitrary and open to dispute, also 
like the Area of Influence method. The most logical alternative – to allocate costs on the basis of estimated 
benefits – is not arbitrary, but is the most difficult to accomplish. … It might be possible to improve the   25
 
However, NERA considered that any drawbacks of the Area of Influence model would 
not be a serious problem: “We believe that the adoption of Financial Transmission Rights 
(FTRs) would make the method of funding by private coalitions so much more attractive 
that the alternative method of allocating payment responsibilities by regulatory formula 
would eventually be used only rarely.” 
61 
 
3.4 Financial transmission rights 
 
As noted in Part One, the Comahue generators had expressed concern about free-riding 
on transmission expansions. They and various authors had seen transmission property 
rights as a desirable development. NERA took this view. Having noted four problems (or 
distortions) with the Argentine transmission expansion system, it explained “how 
Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) solve these four problems, and how they help 
solve several other problems considered in later chapters of this report”.
62  
 
These FTRs were equivalent to tradable Transmission Congestion Contracts (TCCs) as 
developed shortly before then by Hogan (1992). Variants of this idea had been proposed 
in Argentina.
63 These FTRs or TCCs would give the owner the right to the difference in 
nodal prices along any link. NERA said that this would make a generator more willing to 
pay for a new line, replace the potentially distorting Salex fund, reduce the incentive to 
over-expand, and remove the incentive to over-build generation at removed locations and 
in Buenos Aires. NERA also acknowledged two problems of this approach: the need for 
the regulator to determine the MW amount of rights to be assigned to a particular line, 
since this may vary substantially from time to time, and the problem that the addition of 
capacity in one part of the network may have positive or negative effects on capacity in 
other parts. 
 
NERA’s case for reform certainly reflected the prevailing view at the time: that the delay 
to the fourth line was a major problem and that, in most other countries, “the need to 
expand transmission capacity rapidly is not so acute as it is in Argentina”.
64 In retrospect, 
                                                                                                                                                 
allocation of payment responsibilities through a benefits-related calculation, but we doubt that a 
satisfactory method could be found.” NERA 1998, p. 71. 
60 E.g. Pérez-Arriaga and Rubio 2000. Pérez-Arriaga notes that the ‘Beneficiaries method’ explored in New 
Zealand and California depends critically on the assumptions made, including about extent and location of 
future investment and demand response. (personal communication, 28 June 2004) 
61 NERA 1998, p. 71. 
62 NERA 1998, p. 62.  
63 E.g. Abdala, Arrufat and Torres 1997, advising the Comahue generators, developed the idea of granting 
incremental transmission capacity rights so as to alleviate free riding problems. Jeffrey Roark of Southern 
Electric (owners of Alicurá hydro station) sent papers on this to NERA, and no doubt many others did too. 
(Mr Roark was involved in building the Fourth Line as Power Market Analyst, Southern Electric 
International. He is now Senior Straategic Planning Advisor, Tennessee Valley Authority. 
64 NERA 1998, pp. 11-12. NERA was also aware of concerns expressed by generators that lack of property 
rights was deterring further transmission investment.   26




Nevertheless, the case for financial transmission rights is one that several economists 
have advocated, and generators in Argentina were generally sympathetic.
66 NERA 
reflected this view, and drew attention to potential distortions in the absence of such 
rights. Concerns about free riding in the absence of such rights do seem to have been a 
factor influencing some generators to vote against the Fourth Line on the first occasion.
 67  
In drawing up initial policy the transmission privatisation team may have underestimated 
the extent to which gas-fired generators would simply build more capacity if the fourth 
line were built to meet the demand from existing hydro capacity.  
 
NERA did not establish how far the identified distortions actually did operate in practice 
in Argentina, nor in which overall direction. And it is not clear that any economic 
investments actually were precluded or delayed by the absence of financial transmission 
rights in Argentina. Nevertheless, NERA’s recommendations were attractive to the 
Government in many respects, insofar as they promised to strengthen the role of market-
based decision-making. And whereas granting physical property rights to network users 
seemed inconsistent with the fundamental principle of open access to Argentine 
networks, financial rights seemed a way of reconciling open access with the need to 
protect new investors against free riding.  
 
However, the best form of implementation of financial transmission rights was not 
obvious at the time.
68 The Energy secretariat needed time to consider the issue.
69 The 
analysis that NERA had begun was therefore continued and developed in detail in the 
                                                 
65 Indeed, Part One suggests that the transmission system was over-expanded and if there was an acute need 
it was to stop building long and expensive lines. 
66 An early advocate was Hogan 1992, 2003. For some further discussion of FTRs and TCCs in the 
Argentine context see Abdala and Chambouleyron 1999, Gómez-Ibáñez 2003.  
67 See Part One, though as noted there, the term free-riding has to be interpreted with care. It is not the case, 
as some imply, that existing generators pay for the expansion then entrants come along and ride for free. If 
entrants make use of the new line to the same extant as incumbents, then they pay the same for it. The 
concern of hydro-generating incumbents was a slightly different one: that they might vote for an expansion 
that would be profitable for them if no entrants appeared, but if this caused thermal generators to appear 
and preclude them from using some peak capacity, then they would have committed themselves to fund an 
investment that was unprofitable for themselves.  
68 “Ideally, TCCs could help create a market-oriented system where private investors – not the government 
– decided when and where additional transmission capacity was needed based in part on the values of the 
TCCs. // TCCs were a relatively new idea, however, and there was relatively little practical experience to 
guide Argentina. … the first transmission system to implement TCCs – the PJM in the United States – was 
not scheduled to do so until April 1999. And even then no one had fashioned TCCs into a working program 
of investment incentives.” Gómez-Ibáñez 2003, p. 318.  
69 The Secretariat had been expecting recommendations to do with the Area of Influence method, was 
surprised by the emphasis on FTRs in the final NERA report, wondered whether these recommendations 
were appropriate to Argentina, and considered that FTRs might be part of the solution rather than the whole 
or main solution.   27




Mirkin stepped down at the end of 1998, as did other officials that had worked with him. 
The analysis was substantially finished; it was accepted in principle by the incoming 
Energy Secretary Cesar Mac Karthy and Under-Secretary Luis Sbértoli, who put it out to 
consultation.
71 Mac Karthy issued the ‘second round of reform proposals’ in October 
1999. They included congestion rights to developers of new lines - more precisely, the 
rights to differences in nodal prices.
72 The congestion rights to existing lines were to be 
auctioned on an annual basis, and the proceeds of these bids assigned to the Salex Fund, 
which would continue to be used for transmission expansion. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
given the original thinking, subsequent experience, and NERA’s remarks, no change was 
proposed to the Area of Influence method.  
 
3.5 Risk-bearing expansions 
 
Financial rights were not in fact the Secretariat’s first priority for transmission reform. 
The Energy Secretary’s main proposal was a novel method for building new transmission 




This method would be initiated when a group of investors who promised to 
assume responsibility for at least 30 per cent of the cost of a line approached 
ENRE. ENRE would then conduct two auctions. The first would be to determine 
which investors would get to finance the line. The investment rights would be 
awarded to the group of investors that forecast the highest percentage utilization 
of the line.
74 The second auction would be to award a concession to construct, 
operate and maintain the new line [as in the Public Contest method]. 
 
                                                 
70 The Group comprised Ignacio Pérez-Arriaga, Alex Papalexopulus and Larry Ruff, together with three 
representatives of the Secretary of Energy: Beatriz Arizu, José Sanz and Ramón Sanz.  
71 The new Under Secretary Luis Sbértoli asked Beatriz Arizu to stay on and formalise in regulatory 
amendments the proposals on transmission and other market issues that had been developed by the Expert 
Group. José Sanz too stayed for some time. Sbértoli and Ruy Varela had worked in the transmission 
planning sector of Agua y Energía before leaving to found the consulting group Sigla in 1976/7. At the 
beginning of the Menem government (1989-91) Sbértoli had joined the Secretariat of Energy with 
responsibility for planning the energy sector. 
72 SE Resolution 543/1999, 19 October 1999. 
73 They are also called ‘At risk’ expansions. It is not that they are riskier than other expansions, but that 
investors rather than users bear the risks associated with future levels of demand and price. 
74 “In this first auction the initiating investors and any other interested parties submitted sealed bids for the 
capacity rights. The bid would specify the proportion of the line’s construction cost the bidder wanted to 
assume and the average percentage of the total capacity of the line the bidder believed would be utilized 
during the fifteen year amortization period. ENRE would rank the bids in descending order of expected 
capacity utilization and then go down the list until 100 per cent of the construction cost was covered. The 
expected capacity utilization of the last bid accepted would be used later in calculating the remuneration of 
the investors.” (footnote in original)   28
The at-risk method differed from the voting method in that the investors 
proposing the line did not have to be generators or other participants in the 
wholesale power market. Moreover, the investors, rather than the users, would be 
directly responsible for making the fifteen annual payments to the COM 
concessionaire. In return, the investors would have the right to charge users a toll 
equal to the payment due the COM concessionaire times the ratio of the actual to 
the expected utilization of the line. This scheme forced investors to assume part of 
the risk of whether the new line was needed. Investors would lose money on the 
tolls if utilization was lower than they expected and make profits if utilization was 




Two additional features might be noted. Resolution 543 provided that this Risk 
Expansion method could draw on the Salex Funds for up to 30 per cent of the 
construction cost if the bids received did not fully cover it. Access to Salex Funds was 
necessary to prevent the lack of this feature distorting choice between expansion 
methods, to reduce the waiting time until enough parties were willing to support a line, 
and to constitute a contribution from ‘passive’ network users that might benefit in a 
general way from a new facility. Nevertheless, since reliance on use of Salex seemed 
inconsistent with the concept of investors bearing risk, the limit was put at 30 per cent of 
the cost whereas the Public Contest method was able to draw on Salex Funds for up to 70 
per cent of the cost. 
 
Second, the hurdle for automatic vetoing of a proposed Risk Expansion was set at 60 per 
cent of the votes, calculated according to the traditional Area of Influence method, 
compared with 30 per cent under the Public Contest method. This was to discourage 
unjustified opposition, on the basis that if some investors were willing to assume a risk 
there was no cause to oppose them. Also, the existence of financial transmission rights 
could make some users immune to congestion and uninterested in supporting an 
expansion – or even in favour of congestion because it increased the value of their 
transmission rights, and therefore opposed to expansion that would reduce this value. 
However, if opposing votes were not above 60 per cent but there was nevertheless “well-
founded opposition according to ENRE criteria”, it was open to ENRE to examine the 
social benefit of the line, to which end it could request consultants to investigate the 
matter.
76 But it could only do this if opponents of the proposal presented some 
convincing evidence that the social benefits of the line were actually negative, and it 
could only veto the proposal if its investigation confirmed this. ENRE had to inform 
participants of its final decision within 90 days. 
 
                                                 
75 Gómez-Ibáñez 2003, p. 318. Note that the provision for users paying a toll equal to the concession 
payment multiplied by the proportion of actual to expected utilisation of the line was also a means of 
reducing payments in the early years before the line had reached its full capacity.  
76 The Secretariat of Energy envisaged that ‘social benefit’ would be evaluated in conventional economic 
terms (aggregate change in consumer surplus plus producer surplus), but this was not written into 
Resolution 543, thereby introducing uncertainty about its interpretation.   29
The Risk-bearing Expansion method was not mentioned in the NERA report. It seems to 
have been developed within the Secretariat of Energy and its advisory group rather than 
to have been urged on them by consultants, academics, generators or other market 
participants. It does not appear to have been taken directly from the economic literature, 
though it reflected economists’ interest in a process for encouraging the revelation of 
benefits, as a response to the problem faced by a regulator having to measure these 
benefits. (This was a different problem from the free-riding problem identified by 
NERA.) The proposal was also informed by recent experience in the UK 
telecommunications sector, where spectrum auctions had led to higher bids than could 
have been predicted by an ex ante regulatory evaluation of benefits.
77 
 
The Secretariat of Energy seems to have been conscious of the criticisms that the 
mechanism for transmission expansion was not working. But rather than abandon it, the 
aim was to achieve greater flexibility in proposing and financing transmission 
investment. Worthwhile investments might be held up because market participants were 
unduly pessimistic, or unable to agree among themselves. This method would allow 
others to step in and enable the investment to go ahead. It would enable others to take the 
risks about future usage that market participants might be reluctant to assume, and could 
thereby reduce transactions costs.
78 
 
Resolution 543 embodying transmission rights and risk-bearing expansions was passed 
on 19 October 1999, followed on 21 October by Resolution 545 reforming the rest of the 
electricity sector (discussed above). These two resolutions represented the culmination of 
a carefully considered ‘second round of reform’ in the Argentine electricity sector.
79 With 
the exception of one brief interlude to be discussed shortly, these were the last reforms 
consistent with the original philosophy.  
 
These reforms in Resolution 543 had a mixed reception. For example, generators 
supported congestion rights but argued that the rights for existing lines should be 
allocated to existing users rather than auctioned for the benefit of the national 
government. They also objected that the Risk-bearing Expansion method left them with 
substantial obligations to finance new capacity but with no say in whether it should be 
undertaken. In contrast, Resolution 545 was largely discussed with the market before 
implementation, and substantial consensus was reached.  
 
                                                 
77 In retrospect, the UK telecommunications bidders nay have overbid, and lower bids were subsequently 
observed in other European countries. There is also evidence that market interconnectors in Australia did 
not turn out to be profitable. See Littlechild 2003, 2004. 
78 Other measures were considered but not implemented. For example, some parties were not willing to 
propose an expansion by Contract Between Parties because other parties would use the capacity but pay 
only operation and maintenance cost, with no contribution to the cost of construction.  Deputy Secretary 
Luis Sbértoli considered the possibility of an expansion method that allowed the parties to a Contract 
Between Parties to levy on other users a regulated capacity charge to recover the cost of construction that 
had been put out to tender.  
79 Resolution 208/1998 introducing quality expansions was also a modification in sympathy with the initial 
philosophy, but not developed as part of the ‘second round’ of reform.   30
There was little time to appraise the effect of these reforms. On 24 October the general 
election took place, and President Menem’s government fell. The fate of the reforming 
resolutions is explained shortly. But one further set of resolutions was passed before the 
change of government took place. 
 
4.  The Federal Plan 
 
4.1 The Federal Council 
 
Argentina is a federal country in which the provincial governments have significant 
power. This had caused difficulties even before privatisation.
80 It also caused difficulties 
in reforming the sector, and the parties had to come to an accommodation. A priority was 
to resolve the inadequate (and sometimes non-existent) payments made by provincial 
utilities to the national energy companies. This was problematic: some provinces declared 
unilateral discounts to themselves or demanded that they should pay lower than 
commercial prices, other provinces were in financial difficulties.
81 The Government 
therefore offered a further inducement to participate in reform: “the provinces which 
adhere to the tariff principles emanating from the new organization will be eligible to 




The Electricity Regulation Act (Law 24065) provided for a surcharge (sometimes called a 
stamp) of up to $3.00/MWh on purchases by large users and distribution companies in 
the wholesale electricity market. The Federal Council (CFEE), a pre-reform vehicle for 
negotiating with the provinces,
83 determined the criteria for the allocation of these funds. 
                                                 
80 “Since [1979], most of the provincial electric power enterprises were created to undertake distribution 
functions, previously carried out by AyE. However, as a consequence of the autonomy exercised by the 
provinces in conducting their activities – given the federal spirit of the Constitution – the co-ordination 
between provincial and federal enterprises and the SE [Secretary of Energy] for the operation and 
development of the electric system did not turn out very well. // Before 1990, the legal framework for the 
Argentine electric power sector did not impose a clear and coherent regulatory system that fostered 
efficiency. There were overlapping regulatory jurisdictions among different levels of government authority, 
which did not allow a clear definition of the principal-agent relationship. In many provinces, electricity was 
supplied by enterprises that depended on the local political power and that responded to the authority of the 
local executive power: they were only restricted by the need to have the provincial legislature approve their 
accounts. In general, tariffs to consumers were not related to costs, but rather to political objectives, 
causing major cross-subsidies between consumers.” Bastos and Abdala 1993/6, p. 134 
81 “According to an SEE report (1992), the provinces showed distinct difficulties in honouring their 
commitments.” Bastos and Abdala 1993/6, p. 134 footnoting “Process of Transformation of the Electricity 
Sector”, Cabinet meeting, SEE (1/9/92). 
82 “The formal acceptance by provinces of the new sector scheme established by the regulatory framework 
was provided for in Law 24065. [Article 70, Section b of this Act and its implementing regulations] … The 
provinces were then faced with the decision to adhere or not to the national regime.” Bastos and Abdala 
1993/6, p. 136. 
83 The Federal Electricity Council (Consejo Federal de Energía Eléctrica, or CFEE), created in 1960, is “a 
national organization in which the provinces are represented together with the SEE [Secretariat of 
Electricity]. CFEE acts as adviser to the National Executive Power (NEP) [the Executive Branch of the 
National Government] and coordinates and administers various specific project funds created to develop 
the sector.” Bastos and Abdala 1993/6, p. 63   31
Article 70 of Law 24065 provided that 60 percent of these surcharge revenues would be 
distributed to provinces that adhered to the federal scheme for distribution tariffs, in order 
to subsidize consumers. The remaining 40 percent would be directed to another Fund for 
electricity development in the country’s interior, including rural electrification.  
 
The surcharge was initially set at $3.00/MWh in 1991, then reduced to $2.40/MWh in 
1993.
84 During the course of the 1990s the level of purchases in the wholesale market 
increased from about 40,000 to 70,000 GWh per year, and the total proceeds of the 
surcharge increased accordingly. From 1993 to 2000 the 60% proportion intended to 
subsidize tariffs yielded a total of $642m (an average of $80 m/year). The 40% 
proportion available for electricity development in the country’s interior, at the disposal 
of the Federal Council, yielded a total of $428 m. To this latter figure should be added 
$413m from a liquid fuel tax.
85  
 
During the 1990s, the role of the Federal Council was limited to spending the revenue 
from this surcharge. It seems to have had a significant impact on the development of the 
sub-transmission and distribution networks.
86 However, the Federal Council had no 
impact on the expansion of high-voltage 500 kV lines, or on sector policy generally. This 
was now to change. 
 
4.2 The Federal Transmission Fund 
 
Throughout the 1990s, there were strong political and industry pressures to make more 
transmission expansions than the Public Contest method had delivered, and beyond what 
the newly introduced provisions for congestion rights and Risk expansions were expected 
to provide.
 A wide variety of new lines were canvassed.
87 The Federal Council was 
particularly active in criticising policy and advocating a larger role for state planning, and 
in 1998 it commissioned a study of needed high-voltage expansions.
88 The criticisms 
                                                 
84 Resolutions SE 317 (15 October 1993) and SE 335 (29 October 1993). 
85 Source: www.cfee.gov.ar. The liquid fuel tax derives from Law 23966, Articles 7 & 19, of 1 August 
1999. 
86 Investments are detailed by province at www.cfee.gov.ar. Analysis by Mercados Energéticos suggests 
that, with the exception of one 500/132 kV substation in 1997, the funds were used for expansions and 
developments at 132 kV or lower, including low voltage grids, isolated generation in small towns, rural 
electrification and small hydroelectric power plants.  132 kV lines approved and built totalled 3893 km 
from 1978 to 1991 and 1441 km from 1992 to 2001; of the latter figure 707 km were expansions on 
regional (sub-) transmission networks and 734 km were expansions in distribution networks. Since some 
2705 km of new 132 kV lines were constructed in the sub-transmission systems over the period 1992 to 
2002 (CAMMESA Annual Report 2002), it seems that the Federal Council Funds accounted for about a 
quarter of the total. The Public Contest method accounted for somewhat less. The balance presumably 
came from the Contract Between Parties method or by distribution companies without support of the 
Federal Council. 
87 Some provinces argued that other provinces had benefited from federal funding of transmission 
investment before reform, and that it was unfair that they themselves would have to pay for it. 
88 “… it is evident that the model then current was not capable of generating the economic signals that 
would induce the market participants to invest in this way, which was aggravated by the total disappearance 
of the State both from planning and from investment itself. This was clearly perceived by the Council in 
1998, in which year it commissioned studies to identify the most urgent projects at 500 kV, a process that 
culminated in November 1999 with an agreement among all the provinces to implement what became   32
intensified after the failure of the Edesur distribution system in February 1999.
89 The 
government felt constrained to respond to the pressure for regional expansions, and held 
discussions with the Federal Council during 1999.  
 
In December 1999, Secretary Mac Karthy issued Resolution 657 to finance additional 
regional expansions by increasing the amount of the surcharge, to be put into a Federal 
Transmission Fund, and involving the Federal Council in the spending of the proceeds. 
90  
 
This Resolution was expressed quite differently from previous statements of President 
Menem’s Government and its other Energy Secretaries. They had emphasised the role of 
competition and markets following the Electricity Regulation Act (Law 24065 of 1992.  
 
In contrast, Resolution 657 harked back to an Electricity Act from a previous era (Law 
15336 from 22 September 1960) that embodied a different philosophy. That earlier Act 
had set up the Federal Council. Resolution 657 now recalled that the Secretary of Energy, 
advised by the Federal Council, had responsibility for planning and coordination of 
projects and integrated services of the National Interconnected Network. It noted that, to 
this end, the Federal Council had made a feasibility study to identify potential 
beneficiaries of possible high voltage transmission expansions, including a preliminary 
analysis of closing the high voltage rings.
91 
 
Resolution 657 argued that a regime of competition such as the MEM requires political 
action on the part of the national state, so as to guarantee transparency and access by 
consumers to the markets; that it was the responsibility of the national state to establish 
and preserve adequate conditions in the market, particularly in those zones or regions 
                                                                                                                                                 
known as the Federal Plan of Electricity Transmission, with the objective of securing the execution of four 
projects at 500 kV, that is to say, the Mining Line, the interconnections NEA-NOA [Northeast – 
Northwest], the interconnection MEM-MEMSP [with Patagonia] and the interconnection Comahue-Cuyo. 
// To make this a reality, a totally novel financial engineering was designed, which among other things 
assumed the already evident necessity of a strong participation by the state, and no less importantly by the 
private sector, all this in a strategy designed so that state participation was the trigger for the private, to 
make it economically feasible. …// In short, at the heart of CFEE, all the Argentine provinces assumed the 
necessity of planning in this vital area where it was not being done, and of participating in investments if 
these were to be carried out in the necessary time periods.” CFEE, Tenemos Mucho Que Hacer [We have 
much to do], at www.cfee.gov.ar, as accessed 2 August 2004. 
89 Even though this was irrelevant to transmission expansion, and associated with the installation of new 
transformer rather than with the lack of investment. It was the first tangible opportunity to criticise the 
electricity sector reforms. The $80m penalty on the distribution company was extremely high, unparalleled 
worldwide before or since, yet some still deemed it insufficient. 
90 SE Resolution 657/1999, 3 December 1999. 
91 That is, the extensions in question would link the ends of the radial arms located in the outlying regions, 
and thereby create rings of high voltage lines. This would convert the existing radial network to a more 
meshed network. “Additional radial lines into the Buenos Aires region would be needed as demand grew, 
including new links to the Northeast and eventually a fifth line to Comahue. // Equally intriguing was the 
potential for new ring or circumferential transmission lines to improve the reliability of the electricity 
system. The biggest need was for a medium- or high-voltage ring around the Buenos Aires metropolitan 
area. … There were also some advocates in the industry for another high-voltage ring line to connect the 
outer regions of the country (for example, Comahue – Cuyo – Northwest – Northeast).” Gómez- Ibáñez 
2003, pp. 316-317. The Federal Council’s study itself was not made public.    33
where there were monopoly situations or the risk of them; that there were economies of 
interconnected networks; that the procedures initially developed for the expansion of the 
transmission network implicitly assumed an underlying growth and homogeneity of 
supply from the high voltage network to all the provinces; and that this assumption was 
appropriate for zones of relatively high growth and concentration of demand, but did not 
envisage the situation of some provinces and regions caused by asymmetrical growth in 
the high voltage network. 
 
The 23 provinces in the Federal Council had earlier asked the Secretary of Energy to 
increase the surcharge from $2.40/MWh to $3.00/MWh: he now did this with effect from 
May 2000. The additional $0.60/MWh was to be put into a Federal Transmission Fund 
(FFTEF) that the national government could use for extending the 500 kW transmission 
system by means of ‘expansions intended to meet demand’. To facilitate this, the Federal 
Council was allowed to initiate a Risk-bearing expansion (other methods were not 
mentioned). The criteria for such expansions were that they would be of benefit to the 
Electricity System to improve quality and/or security and/or reduce the costs of dispatch 
in a scenario of progressive integration of the regions; that they were unlikely to be 
realised exclusively by the private sector, for reasons of scale; and that they would 
constitute investment for “expansion of a federal character”.  
 
No figures were mentioned at this stage, nor was there any definition of ‘benefit’. With 
an annual demand of about 70,000 GWh, the increased $0.60/MWh would yield about 
$40m per year for such new projects.
92  
 
Resolution 657 establishing the general policy framework for regional expansions was 
introduced on 3 December 1999. On the same day the Secretary of Energy declared that 
the interconnection with Patagonia was financeable – that is, it had met the conditions of 
Resolution 657. Its purpose was “to interconnect a remaining isolated area”. It had been 
chosen for support under this policy. He instructed the Federal Council to prepare the 
documentation to start the process.
93 Four days later, he extended this support to the so-
called Mining Line, whose purpose was “to improve conditions for developing mining 
activity in marginal areas”.
94 
 
Why was there such a sudden change of policy on the part of President Menem’s 
administration? In its closing days, it is not uncommon for an outgoing Argentine (and 
Brazilian) administration to pass many resolutions (sometimes hundreds) as an 
acknowledgement for past or future political support, knowing that it will not have to 
                                                 
92 Other provisions of Resolution 657/1999 included 1) an instruction to the Federal Council to write the 
statutory rules for the Federal Fund before 1 March 2000, which resulted in the Federal Council’s Acta 97 
discussed below, and 2) a rule that a line cannot be financed by the Federal Fund if the average 
participation of generators is greater than 20 per cent (of average net present value discounted at 10 per 
cent). (Note that the Fifth Line (Comahue – Cuyo version) did not fit this rule, and the criteria were later 
relaxed.) 
93 Resolution SE 658 (3 December 1999): the Patagonia interconnection is the line between Choele-Choel 
and Puerto Madryn. 
94 Resolution SE 665/1999 7 December 1999: the Mining Line is Gran Mendoza – San Juan – La Rioja - El 
Bracho.   34
carry them out and the incoming administration can reject them if it wishes. The 
Resolution accepting the Mining Line was issued just two days before the Menem 
administration left office on 9 December. Perhaps these were simply empty political 
gestures, and the Federal Transmission Fund would not have been introduced if the 
Menem government had been re-elected.  
 
On the other hand, three factors suggest that the government might well have taken a 
similar decision even if it had been re-elected.  
-  First, the government was under very considerable political pressure. It saw its 
proposal to create a new class of lines, with political as well as market 
characteristics, as a reasonable way to accommodate that pressure without 
conceding an undue role for national planning.
95 Tying these lines to the risk-
bearing expansion method meant that the new Fund would be used to ‘finance’ 
rather than subsidise them.  
-  Second, existing Law placed an obligation on the government to bring about a 
single interconnected system in the country. Patagonia was the only area not yet 
interconnected, and plans had been prepared before reform started to remedy this. 
It was difficult to reject that Law and policy.  
-  Third, the Patagonia line would help to resolve an embarrassing and artificial 
situation whereby electricity prices in that system were two to three times the 
average level in the rest of the system. The line would benefit the monopoly 
generator there, but would at the same time facilitate suspending and revising the 
Market Regulations. In the longer term an interconnected system would eliminate 
the problem. The line could also offer prospects of revenue from new generation 
transmitted in the opposite direction, into the main system. The Mining Line was 
also considered to have economic prospects if the anticipated growth in demand 
materialised. Provision of adequate power facilities would have been beneficial to 
mining companies, reliability would be improved, it would have been a 
worthwhile investment and the Fund would be repaid.  
 
The new policy was thus arguably part of an aim to combine very strong political 
pressures and obligations with a predominantly market-based policy, while maintaining 
good relations with the provinces, rather than a concession motivated by the forthcoming 
loss of office. The Federal Council pressed for the new policy to be introduced before the 
Menem government left office because it was not convinced that the incoming 
government would be that sympathetic. In the event, the incoming government turned out 
to be more sympathetic than the outgoing one. 
 
                                                 
95 Such a policy had in fact been discussed earlier. Mirkin and staff had considered the possibility of some 
limited federal assistance to facilitate non-radial lines in order to better integrate the market, while leaving 
the majority of the risk and decision-making with market participants. Policy continued to be strongly 
debated within government. Under-Secretary Sbértoli would have preferred a separate law to be passed 
justifying each proposed regional expansion, together with provision for an associated increase in the 
surcharge, rather than a blanket increase to $3.00 that would create an expectation of further expansion. In 
contrast, Secretary of Energy Mac Karthy was himself from Patagonia district, and sympathetic to the 
policy proposed by the Federal Council.   35
4.3 The Federal Transmission Plan 
 
Whatever the explanation of the previous decision, it turned out to be a sign of a 
changing political climate. An increased – indeed central - role for government reflected 
the initial approach of the new post-Menem administration led by Fernando De La Rua.
96 
Within a few months this approach began to supercede the previous market-oriented 
approach. On 18 May 2000 Daniel Montamat, Secretary of Energy in the new 
administration, explained that he was in course of formulating a Transmission 
Development Plan, in conjunction with the Federal Council, that envisaged the 
application of the additional surcharge just put into effect. This Plan would require a 
thorough reappraisal of transmission expansions, which could conflict with the possible 
Risk expansions and associated congestion rights created by Resolution 543/1999. No 
expansions had yet been proposed under the risk expansion method. Accordingly, he was 
suspending forthwith the application of the changes introduced in that Resolution.
97 Two 
weeks later he suspended Resolution 545/1999 too.
98 
 
The new approach was introduced over the next few months. On 30 June Resolution 174 
confirmed that the transmission surcharge would be a permanent policy.
 99 The Federal 
Transmission Fund would be used to finance projects that the Secretary of Energy would 
identify as high voltage transmission expansions intended to meet demand, as provided 
by Resolution 657/1999. But in addition – and no doubt this reflected further pressure 
from the provinces – the Fund could also be used for “projects to interconnect electrical 
regions in order to improve the quality and/or security of supply”. The Secretary of 
Energy would take the final decision on the lines, but it was envisaged that the 
Committee of Administration (CAF) of the Federal Transmission Fund - composed of 
two representatives of the Secretary of Energy and one from the Federal Council - would 
propose them. 
 
                                                 
96 “Fernando de la Rua’s administration, which took office in January 2000, supported a renewed federal 
role in the provision of transmission infrastructure, and even went so far as to question the soundness of 
privatisation and the regulatory system’s capacity to ensure reliable electricity services.” Bouille et al, 
2003, p. 47.  It is not uncommon for parties in opposition at the time of such reforms to accept privatisation 
but to criticise and change the nature of the regulatory regime. 
97 Resolution SE 133/2000, 18 May 2000.  In addition, some flaws had been perceived in the Risk-bearng 
Expansion method. Beneficiaries had to pay a proportion of the fee according to the load factor of the line, 
without any transference to them of congestion rights, which left them vulnerable to proposals by investors 
who retained all the congestion rights. Secondly, 60 per cent of the votes seemed a difficult hurdle to 
overcome for those who opposed a line, and there was some concern about the subjectivity of ‘convincing 
evidence’ on social benefit, and about how reliable ENRE’s evaluation of social benefits could be. 
98 The new Government was not necessarily opposed to Resolution 545/1999 introducing the other reforms 
in the electricity sector, and was not sure what abolishing them would imply, hence wanted time to consider 
them first. To that end, Resolution 153 (31 May 2000) suspended Resolution 545 pending review. In the 
event, a formal review was never completed, there were reportedly political differences within the 
Government as to the role of the market, and eventually Resolution SEM 128 (9 February 2001) derogated 
(i.e. repealed) Resolution 545 entirely. 
99 Resolution SE 174/2000, 30 June 2000   36
Article 8 of Resolution 174 endorsed the concept of the Federal Transmission Plan 
introduced earlier by the Federal Council.
100  Under the extended criteria, all five lines in 
the Federal Transmission Plan were specified as financeable from this Fund, not just the 
two lines declared financeable earlier.
101.  
 
The five lines presented for consideration by the Federal Council, with the Federal 
Council’s summary comments, were as follows:  
 
-  Comahue – Cuyo interconnection (660 km): to improve the transmission of 
generation from Comahue and to improve the quality of service in Cuyo. From 
2003 this will take on great importance for Cuyo (where local prices are predicted 
to be greater than in the national Wholesale Market). 
-  NOA-NEA (northwest – northeast) interconnection (1015 km): associated with 
the expansion of generation in NOA, and to give the possibility of exporting it 
(these exports would need to be postponed without the expansion of the line) 
-  interconnection of the national system MEM with the Patagonia system MEMSP 
(354 km): to permit the optimisation of both systems, and improve joint operation 
and economic reserve for MEMSP. 
-  Interconnection CUYO – NOA, the Mining line with 3 possible sections (175 km, 
165 km and 215 km, total 555 km): the most economic means of facilitating 
mining growth in the mountain area. 
-  Buenos Aires - Mar del Plata (350 km), to solve the historical problems of the 
Mar del Plata city supply. 
 
These lines are indicated on the system map in Figure 1.
102 
 
                                                 
100 Resolution 174 refers to a ‘general agreement’ between all provincial representatives at the Federal 
Council on 11 November 1999. This agreement was the antecedent for Resolution 657/99, and was later 
ratified and extended in another plenary meeting at the Federal Council on 6 April 2000. As a result of this 
last meeting the Federal Council issued an official document (CFEE Acta No. 97 of 6 April 2000). This 
document created what the Federal Council called ‘a new mechanism to finance expansions’ to be 
presented to the Secretariat of Energy. (This was basically to finance new lines that fulfilled the criteria of 
Resolutions 657/99 and later 174/2000, using the Federal Transmission Fund.) A list with five lines to be 
developed under this procedure was attached to the Federal Council document and described as a Federal 
Transmission Plan. Resolution 174 approved what the Federal Council proposed in its Acta 97. 
101 The declaration that the five lines in the Federal Plan were “financeable” does not mean that there were 
sufficient funds to pay for them all. The real feasibility test is carried out when the line is finally approved. 
This happens when a Promotion Contract is signed between the initiators of the project and the CAF, and 
the Execution Committee (formed by CAF and the private initiators) is formally constituted. At that stage, 
all the parties, including CAF, have to commit a firm bid (in $) that determines the participation of each 
one in the investment and in the ownership of the transmission rights.  
102 Source: Mercados Energéticos   37
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4.4 The Open Season method 
 
On the same day as Resolution 174 endorsed the Federal Transmission Plan, Resolution 
175 introduced the concept of an ‘Open Season’ for initiating transmission expansions 
and inviting joint private/public funding.
103 Resolution 175 and its successors
104 also 
sought to integrate the concept of expansions via the Federal Transmission Fund with 
existing methods for transmission expansion.  
-  The Federal Transmission Fund, represented by CAF, was incorporated as a 
‘special participant’ within the existing methods (Public Contest and Contract 
between Parties).  
-  A concept called “expansions through Financial Transmission Rights (FTR) 
Allocation” was introduced (subsequently used in practice for cases where the 
Federal Transmission Fund was involved).
105  
-  The concept of a Non-Initiating Beneficiary was introduced to provide some 
protection to these market participants.
106 
-  The concept of Open Season was created to take forward the Federal Plan. This 
was a new way to initiate an expansion, with three possibilities according to who 
initiated the process: 
a)  the Federal Transmission Fund via CAF 
b)  any market participant seeking partial funding from the Federal 
Transmission Fund 
c)  any market participant without participation of the Federal Transmission 
Fund. 
Any of these Open Season processes could be used to introduce any of the 
existing methods (Public Contest or Contract between Parties) or the new 
Financial Rights Allocation method. 
-  By declaring an Open Season on a particular line, and specifying the duration of 




Private sector participants would compete for each line in terms of their proposed 
participation, calculated as the annual amount offered divided by the estimated fee. If the 
                                                 
103 Resolution SE 175/2000, 30 June 2000. This also provided that the Salex Fund could be an initiator too, 
if the other initiators or the CAF requested use of its funds, provided that ENRE approved. 
104 Notably Resolution SEM 178 (8 November 2000), which was a revised version of 175, that included for 
the first time the concept of ‘expansions through financial rights allocation’. 
105 Recall that Resolution 133/2000 had suspended Resolution 543/1999 that had introduced the Risk-
bearing expansion method and congestion rights. 
106 The idea was that initiators of a line would pay for it and own the FTR Allocation. Any other existing 
beneficiary (identified through the Area of Influence method) would not have to pay for the line. In the 
event of a new beneficiary being identified (e.g. via an increase in demand or the arrival of new generation) 
– this would be a Non-Initiating Beneficiary - each initiator that had been paying for the line would have 
two options: to retain the FTR without any charge to the new beneficiary for use of the line, or to oblige the 
new user to pay a share of the fee in proportion to its use of the line, transferring to it a corresponding share 
of the FTR Allocation. 
107 There was no limit on the private participation in any project, but in case the private participation was 
lower than 20 per cent, a representative of the Federal Transmission Fund should chair the ‘Execution 
Committee’ of the project.   39
sum of the offers were not enough to cover the total cost, the Federal Transmission Fund 
would make up the remaining funds necessary, up to a maximum equal to the expected 
benefit of the line.
108 If, even with the maximum Fund support, there were not sufficient 
offers to cover the expected fee, the CAF would ask for new offers. If the estimated fee 
were not reached after the second call, the expansion would be discarded, otherwise it 
would be accepted. If the Federal Fund did not have sufficient funds to support all the 
lines presented, priority would be given to those lines with higher expected profitability, 
calculated on the basis of the estimated fee and expected benefits, where these values 
were as specified in Resolution 218/2000. 
 
The Open Season method was thus a means by which the Government and the Federal 
Council could propose and implement high voltage expansions. It incorporated an 
attempt to reveal the willingness of the private sector to participate in such investments. 
And even now some within the Government were keen to ensure that the Open Season 
method remained consistent with a primarily market methodology. But several features of 
the method remained unclear, such as what criteria the government would use to select 
expansions when no private interest was manifest, as with the Mining Line. 
 
4.5 Initial experience with the Open Season method and the Federal Plan 
 
A week later, the Secretary of Energy declared Open Season for the five lines in the 
Federal Transmission Plan.
109 All of the lines adopted would get a Financial 
Transmission Rights (FTR) Allocation. Since the Regulations and processes were not 
entirely clear, there was a period of discussions, lobbying by interested parties, and 
government clarifications. Four months later, in November 2000, the Secretary of Energy 




Shortly afterwards, Presidential Decree 1135 confirmed Resolution 657/99 establishing 
the Federal Transmission Fund (FFTEF) “which shall have as its objective the financing 
of transmission expansions that the Secretary of Energy identifies as financeable.”
 111 The 
Decree indicated that the Federal Transmission Plan envisaged a total investment of $750 
million.
112 The underlying aim was reaffirmed: “From the economic point of view, this 
measure is indispensably driven by the goal of sponsoring growth and development of the 
                                                 
108 Resolution 175 introduced the concept of ‘benefit to the electricity system’ for the Open Season process, 
defined as the difference between the total expected cost of the system with and without the investment in 
question. For those expansions where support from the Federal Fund was requested, the detailed 
methodology to evaluate benefits was to be developed by CAF, but in the event this did not happen. 
109 Resolution SE 182/2000, 7 July 2000. 
110 Resolution SEM 178/2000, 8 November 2000. 
111 Decree 1135/2000, 29 November 2000. The Decree was said to speed up the normal constitutional 
process; it also helped to reassure the Federal Council, who feared that Secretary of Energy Resolution SE 
657/1999 might be insufficient to ensure the promised funding. (Tax increases can only be approved by 
Congress.) The Budget Law for 2001 (Art. 74, Law 24501/29 December 2000) also made provision for the 
$0.6/MWh surcharge. 
112 Although the annual income of the Federal Fund was only about $40m, it was hoped to attract 
substantial private participation.   40
sector, the positive effects of which will propagate themselves throughout the rest of the 
economy.”  
 
The Decree referred to previous delays (“extensions in the timetable caused by the 
intrinsic complexity of the Plan and the need to consider the many improvements in the 
system suggested by the possible proponents and the provinces” – not helped by the lack 
of clarity of the regulations.) Giving a political impetus to the policy, it emphasised that 
“a new delay in the project would have prejudicial effects on the development of the 
prized plan, and even the uncertainty about its statutory basis would bring the risk of lack 
of investment and the stagnation of a sector with ample possibilities of growth, in view of 
the possible desertion of those potentially interested in developing the expansion.”  
 
Next day, the Secretary of Energy announced a revised and higher profile composition of 
the Committee of Administration (CAF) of the Federal Transmission Fund.
113  
 
In response to claims from several potential investors that the Federal Plan was unclear, 
and that there were significant uncertainties about the money that the government would 
finally commit for each line, the Federal Council decided to clarify the projects itself. 
Resolution 218 approved details of the projects and allocation criteria and also listed the 
expected benefits and the estimated fee and methodologies to be applied for each 
expansion, as per an earlier publication of the Federal Council.
 114 The main details were 
as follows: 
1.  Northwest-Northeast: PC method with Federal Fund support, 
estimated annual fee $49.4m reduced to $48.4m by using Salex 
Funds totalling $4.1m, benefit $12.8m/year. 
2.  Patagonian interconnection: FTR allocation method, estimated 
annual fee $19.4m, benefit $23.4m/year. 
3.  Fifth line (Comahue – Cuyo): PC method with Federal Fund 
support, estimated annual fee $43.0m, reduced to $35.5m by 
using Salex Funds totalling $33.0m, benefit $9.3m/year. 
4.  First and second sections of Mining Line: FTR allocation 
method, estimated annual fee $33.1m, benefit $36.6m/year. 
5.  Mar del Plata line: discarded, no benefits identified. 
 
The covering preliminaries to the Resolution noted that, after the Patagonia line 
payments, up to 30 per cent of the available funds in the Federal Fund would support 
investments in the Comahue-Cuyo and Northwest-Northeast lines, the remaining 70 per 
cent would support the Mining Line, and no funds were available for the Mar del Plata 
line. This increased information was a response to the private investors that had requested 
                                                 
113 CAF would now have four members instead of the previous three, comprising the Secretary of Energy 
as President, another representative of the Secretariat, and two representatives of the Federal Council 
instead of the previous one. Resolution SEM 228/2000, 30 November 2000. In practice, CAF works in the 
same offices as the Federal Council, as an internal division of it, and most representatives are or were 
members of the Federal Council. The present Secretary of Energy, Daniel Cameron, was also a previous 
member of the Federal Council. 
114 CFEE Note No. 14400, 15 November 2000, previously approved in plenary session of 28 July 2000, as 
cited in Annex II of Resolution SEM 218 (20 November 2000).   41
more detail about the expected use of the Federal Funds. However, this indication about 
the allocation of funds was a political decision rather than a criterion for allocating funds 
or determining state participation in a new line. 
 
The only accepted offer from the private sector during the Open Season was for the 400 
kV Patagonia line. The Aluar aluminum plant, which also owns and is supplied base load 
by the 472 MW hydro plant at Fuatelufú in the Patagonia system, proposed to contribute 
20% of the cost.
115 In January 2001 Aluar offered $4m for the transmission rights to the 
Patagonia line, subject to the signing of a promotion contract.
116  
 
There was limited interest in taking forward the other lines. Taking them in turn: 
-  Mendoza province in Cuyo region was interested in the Comahue-Cuyo line, but 
failed to interest the Comahue generators.  
-  Generators in the north-west were interested in a line to the north-east in order to 
export to Brazil, but only if they did not have to pay for it. Taking such costs into 
account, the possibility of further exports westwards to Chile was more attractive. 
-  The mining companies in the northwest needed cheap power supplies in order to 
expand, but many of them already had contracts to buy power supplies from 
Chile, which was more economic than from Comahue via Cuyo.  
-  Whether it was more economic to build a line from Buenos Aires to Mar del Plata 
than to install local generation depended on the precise assumptions. However, 
there was a political problem with supporting investments in this region.
 117 
 
In February 2001, after much internal discussion (reflecting the support or otherwise for a 
market approach) the government formally derogated the suspended Resolution 545 of 21 
October 1999, in which the previous government had introduced all the second-round 
reforms to the electricity sector other than transmission expansion.
118 This suggests that 
the pro-market forces within the De La Rua government had not prevailed. 
 
The Public Contest method still applied, and indeed was actively of interest given the 
accumulating funds in the Salex account.
119 The generators wished to use the Funds to 
develop the Comahue-Cuyo line. However, only 70 per cent of the cost could be 
supported from this source, and the generators were reluctant to fund another expansion 
only a few months after the Fourth Line became operative. Negotiations between the 
                                                 
115 The company was considering expanding its aluminum plant and needed additional generation, probably 
via a CCGT, but could use the line as backup and to export energy into the national system. It was 
eventually agreed that the company would contribute 31% of the cost and the government 69%, as noted 
below. 
116 Resolution SEM 33/2001, 12 January 2001. 
117 Even if Buenos Aires city or province were willing to contribute, the Federal Council was reluctant to 
spend funds on projects in this region, which was perceived as sufficiently wealthy not to need federal 
support. The Mar del Plata line was characterised as having no benefits in Annex II of Res SEM 218 2000 
and was removed from the Plan. 
118 Resolution SEM 128(9 February 2001). Recall that Resolution SE 133 (18 May 2000) had already 
suspended the previous government’s Resolution 543 (19 October 1999) that had introduced the 
transmission reforms, as described above. 
119 The Comahue Corridor December 1999 account, set up after the Fourth Line, reached $54 million at the 
end of February 2001.   42
Comahue generators and the Federal Government for support from the Federal 
Transmission Fund continued through much of 2000 and 2001. 
 
At this point, the Federal Transmission Plan was clearly leading the investment process. 
Transener and other transmission companies naturally supported it in public 
presentations.
120 But how far it could be called a Plan, and how far it was economic, are 
both debatable. It reflected studies carried out by the Federal Council, of lines proposed 
by the provincial governments. New transmission lines were argued to be economic. But 
this was on the basis of assumptions proposed by the provinces via the Federal Council, 
which typically involved no generation being built in the regions. The implications of 
alternative assumptions involving generation built in the provinces were not explored in 
any detail (and were not of interest to the Federal Council). Moreover, an expansion no 
longer had to meet the Golden Rule – it was sufficient that the Secretary of Energy found 
that an Open Season expansion was ‘feasible’ based on its ‘social benefit’.
121 
 
None of the lines now said to be important had been identified as needed in 
CAMMESA’s study in 1998. The Patagonia line, chosen as the first priority, was no 
doubt useful to its primary beneficiary. But whether it was economic according to the 
usual criterion of net present value of total costs or benefits is doubtful.
122 Issuing the 
Certificate of Convenience and Public Necessity, ENRE did not claim that it passed the 




                                                 
120 E.g. Silvio M Resnich, President of Transener and of the Argentine Transmission Companies 
Association (ATEERA), ‘Expansion of Regional Transmission Systems’, January 2001, and later. 
121 The Federal Plan says that, at the request of CAF, the Secretary of Energy has to evaluate the feasibility 
of a line based on the associated ‘social benefit’ (without further explanation of this term) before a line is 
declared financeable. This feasibility evaluation substitutes for the Golden Rule, and has to be carried out 
according to the methodology that CAF proposes at the beginning of the Open Season process. 
122 In supporting the line, the Federal Transmission Plan referred to the optimisation of both systems, and 
improving joint operation and economic reserve. As noted, the line provides reserve for supply to Aluar’s 
aluminum plant (and better peaking conditions for it) but not for the rest of the system. In principle Aluar 
could export energy into the national system, but in practice this benefit is limited since Aluar’s power 
station Futaleufú has to compete with Comahue generators for use of the Comahue – Buenos Aires 
corridor. This corridor is congested in peak hours when hydro energy is available in Comahue, which is 
typically when water is available in Futaleufú. Other statements refer to the line reducing monopoly power 
in the Patagonian system. The extent to which the line could do this is very limited, since the new 354 km 
line to the Aluar aluminum transformer goes only half way to the remaining load centres of Patagonia. The 
existing 132 kV line over the remaining distance to those centres (some 400 km to the nearest one) 
effectively constitutes a bottleneck on further supply from the national system. 
123 At the public hearing on the Patagonia line, the exchange with an environmental organization is 
recorded as follows. “That in the said hearing the speakers expressed support for the proposed expansion 
with the exception of the Mayday Foundation (Middle Way and Harmonious Integral Development), which 
considered that the line did not constitute an interconnection between the two systems, since it was a work 
purely and simply for a large user, and was no solution to the problems of our interconnected system. // 
That with respect to such views, it should be explained that the feasibility of the project has already been 
analysed by the Secretariat of Energy and put by the same office through the Open Season method, for 
which purpose it considered that the project in question constitutes an interconnection between the two 
systems.” ENRE 474/2001   43
The Federal Plan thus provided a mechanism for greater influence by ministers, the 
provinces, transmission incumbents, constructors, generators in exporting regions and 
large consumers in importing regions - for all of whom the previous policies of 
transmission over-expansion financed by others were attractive. A central planning and 
political approach had reasserted itself over the market approach embodied in the reforms 
of the 1990s.  
 
5. Temporary reversal of policy 
 
5.1 Bastos returns 
 
At this point, the worsening macroeconomic crisis in Argentina took precedence over 
qualms about the role of the market. In March 2001 President de la Rua invited Domingo 
Cavallo to become Minister of Economy again. This led to a rapid change of direction. 
 
Cavallo, and the team he brought with him, reasserted the need for market 
discipline and significant public sector reforms. Cabinet ministries were 
reorganized, and Carlos Bastos – the chief architect of the reform and 
privatisation of the electricity sector in the early 1990s – was named Minister of 
Infrastructure and Housing, which included the Secretary of Energy and Mining. 
In June 2001, Bastos suspended Mac Karthy’s executive order establishing 
FFTEF [the Federal Transmission Fund], and issued a separate decree that 
reaffirmed the original electricity reforms. The decree introduced a new market 
instrument (congestion licences) intended to make investments in transmission 
more attractive. Additionally it established a transmission reimbursement fund to 
provide additional payments to transmission companies, parties to BOM 
contracts, or holders of congestion licenses, if and when their investments 
enhanced the overall stability of the transmission system.
124 
 
The new policies proposed by Bastos are of particular interest in the present context 
because they did more than simply repeal recent policy and reinstate the previous policy 
of 1992 or 1999. As the quotation indicates, they involved new arrangements for 
transmission expansion that combined the roles of market, regulation and government. 
They were set out in Presidential Decree 804 followed shortly by Resolution 135.
125 
 
The preliminary statement to Decree 804 introduced the following ideas regarding 
transmission expansions: 
1)  During the last few years, transmission investments had been proportionately 
lower than those in generation and distribution, even though several different cost 
allocation measures had been implemented.
126  
                                                 
124 Bouille et al 2003, p. 47.  
125 Presidential Decree 804/2001, 19 June 2001, and Ministry of Infrastructure and Housing Resolution 
MIV 135/2001, 25 June 2001. 
126 Resolution MIV 135 refers to a ‘prospective report’ of the Secretariat of Energy, dated 2000, as 
identifying these delayed investments, which were mainly in regional transmission. It may seem surprising 
that Bastos identified lower investment in transmission as an implicit concern when it was actually an 
achievement of his reform to have used existing transmission lines more efficiently. Perhaps it was a way   44
2)  Investments under the Federal Plan required a high degree of state financing, as 
indicated by the outcome of the Open Season process; this could not be justified, 
and consequently the Decree would derogate the Federal Plan  
3)  Those transmission expansions developed by the market should be treated 
separately from transmission services that are in the public service. 
4)  Several transmission projects could be developed at private risk, so a certificate of 
public convenience and necessity was not needed for them. 
5)  At the same time, some expansions to improve reliability needed to be considered 
under an alternative regime, different from the regime to be applied to expansions 
developed at private risk. 
6)  The existing methodology for transmission expansions tended to socialise 
congestion rent [that is, spread it over all participants], which was not effective 
for developing new investments. It would be better to allocate this rent between 
those parties that assumed the risk of developing the investment. 
 
Decree 804 included the following provisions: 
1)  It recognised as market participants those who own ‘congestion 
rights’(presumably because they trade energy along the line, capturing rent from 
price differences). 
2)  It made the Federal Government the owner of the congestion rights associated 
with existing lines. These rights would thereafter be sold via a public tender. 
3)  It identified as a congestion right that amount of money collected by nodal energy 
prices and transmission capacity charges.
127  
4)  It derogated Decree 1135/2000 (and related Resolutions such as 657 and 174) that 
had confirmed the Federal Plan and authorised the increase of $0.6/MWh in the 
tariff surcharge.  
5)  It provided for ENRE to define which elements of the transmission grid under 
concession require a certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity. 
6)  It created a Transmission Remuneration Fund (Fondo de Remuneracion del 
Transporte) that replaced all the existing transmission accounts and funds. Among 
other things, reliability expansions would be financed through this new general 
account. Only demand would pay for such expansions according to a 
methodology to be determined.
128 
7)  It instructed the Ministry of Infrastructure and Housing (then headed by Bastos 
himself) to implement detailed regulation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
of acknowledging the political concerns associated with the Edesur incident, before explaining that there 
was a better way to solve such problems. 
127 Previously congestion rights (and before that the Salex Fund) extended only to revenues from 
differences in nodal energy charges. The additional reference to capacity charges implicitly accepts that 
nodal prices are not sufficient to remunerate transmission investment, as some argued earlier (see Part One 
Section 9). 
128 The new methodology was never published. It is understood that it would be based on load flows, and 
that the Secretariat of Energy would rank expansions through a centralised decision mechanism, without 
any specific allocation of collected funds by area or corridor. To avoid relying on the Federal Council to 
select expansions it was planned to use the remaining UESTY team at the Secretariat (Special Unit for 
Yacyretá Transmission System, see fn 93 in Part One).    45
Resolution MIV 135, issued a week later, provided a little more detail about Bastos’s 
thinking. It approved ‘guidelines’ for the reform and delegated the development of 
detailed regulation to the Energy Secretariat. These ‘guidelines’, which indicate Bastos’ 
haste in the circumstances, were not sufficiently detailed to replace the existing Market 
Regulations based on Resolution SSEE 61/1992 and associated Resolutions. The main 
provisions of MIV 135 were as follows: 
1)  Congestion rights associated with expansions developed by an independent 
transmission company would be owned by that company. 
2)  The Salex mechanism was derogated.  
3)  Transmission expansions were divided into two types: reliability expansions and 
other expansions. The latter should be developed according to private initiative 
and risk, and for approving such expansions ENRE should only check technical 
compatibility with the existing system and quality standards.
129  
4)  Transmission revenues should consist of four components: 
i)  differences due to nodal energy prices; 
ii)  capacity charges, with specified maximum values of $0.40/MWh for 
each 100 km of lines whose length is less than 250 km, and 
$0.50/MWh per 100 km for lines exceeding 250km; 
iii)  a reliability charge of $0.05/MWh for each 100 km of line; 
iv)  connection charges as implemented by existing regulations. 
5)  The capacity and reliability charges would be paid only by energy buyers, who 
would pay in proportion to their use of the transmission system, which would be 
proportional to their energy purchases as well. Generators would pay transmission 
charges only through nodal prices and connection charges.
130 
6)  The Secretariat was instructed to analyse whether these reforms were suitable for 
regional (sub-)transmission companies as well, or whether they needed 
modifications to make them suitable. 
 
5.2 Response to Bastos 
 
This reversion of policy was controversial. Generators had mixed views about congestion 
rights and the Risk-bearing expansion method, as noted earlier.  Their more specific 
objection to Decree 804 did not concern transmission issues at all, but rather another 
aspect of the Decree, namely capacity payments. These had hitherto been paid based on 
peak output, and generators had long feared that such payments simply encouraged 
generators to bid lower on their energy costs. They advocated relating payments to 
capacity availability rather than to output. Bastos, in contrast, considered such payments 
unnecessary and inappropriate in a competitive market, especially when he was at the 
same time abolishing the caps on generator bidding. Decree 804 provided that the 
existing methodologies for spot price calculation (which was based on variable 
production costs and seasonal declarations of costs) and for capacity payments needed to 
                                                 
129 That is, there was no question of checking the Golden Rule for these expansions. It was also envisaged 
that the Public Contest and Contract Between Parties methods would be superseded by Risk-bearing 
expansions. 
130 The Energy Secretariat was to develop the charging methodology. As Bastos came to realise that his 
reforms would be derogated he left the details to the Secretariat, and the task was never completed.   46
be changed to an energy price calculated hourly and based on the free bidding of 
generators and traders. This would better reveal the opportunity costs involved, improve 
the competitiveness of the market, and be more compatible with the gradual reduction of 
the State participation in the electricity sector as implemented in recent years. 
 
Opposition also came from the Federal Council. Bastos had suspended the Federal 
Transmission Fund, which was the main vehicle by which the Federal Council (and hence 
the Provinces) exercised influence in this sector. Furthermore, he had done this by using a 
Presidential Decree, based rather controversially on a special emergency power given to 
Minister of Economy Cavallo for managing the economic crisis. This created a fear that 
he might next abolish the Federal Council itself (by derogating the earlier law 
establishing it). Given that the Federal Council mirrored the political complexion of 
Congress as a whole, its opposition to Bastos was a much more serious matter than the 
concerns of the generators.  
 
Bastos attempted to implement the new reforms.
131 However, Congress repealed Bastos’ 
policy in September 2001, just three months after it had been introduced.
132 There were 
reportedly discussions between Bastos and the Federal Council to consider a way 
forward. However, De la Rua, Cavallo and Bastos resigned in December 2001 as 
Argentina’s economic crisis deepened.  
 
6.  The crisis and afterwards 
 
6.1 The economic crisis  
 
After the resignation of De La Rua on 20 December 2001, there were three different 
Presidents in twelve days. By the end of the year, Argentina had defaulted on its 
international debts. On 2 January 2002 President Duhalde took office on an interim basis 
to normalise the situation, without any deadline to achieve that. In the event he remained 
for somewhat over one year. To meet the economic crisis, the peso was allowed to float. 
Within six months it had fallen from parity with the US dollar to 3.6 pesos/dollar. In 
February 2002 the tariffs for all regulated services including electricity were frozen at 
their previous peso levels. Bank deposits denominated in dollars were converted to pesos 
at the rate of 1.4 pesos/dollar by decree and converted into government bonds.  
 
All this obviously caused great difficulties for investors as well as for citizens 
generally.
133  Most companies, who had borrowed in foreign currency, were left 
                                                 
131 MIV 259 (15 Aug 2001) provided that the reforms established in Resolution 135 would be put in force 
on 1 February 2002. SEM 190 (17 Aug 2001) formally terminated the Open Season process for the 
Northwest-Northeast interconnection. ENRE 474 (22 Aug 2001) issued the Certificate for the Patagonia 
interconnection, which was already underway and unaffected by the derogation of the Federal Plan in 
Decree 804. 
132 Law 25468, 12 September 2001, put into effect 12 October 2001, nullified his use of the special Decree. 
133 “Most privatised utilities were under foreign control at the start of the crisis and had prices that were 
officially pegged to the US dollar. This was the contractual underpinning of the large investments which 
overseas companies have made in Argentina since 1990. In the electricity sector total investment was   47
shouldering heavy losses. The utilities and their foreign owners were often blamed for the 
economic crisis. Not surprisingly, there was now significantly less willingness and ability 
by the private sector to invest in Argentine utilities, including in the transmission system. 
At the same time Government funds were strictly limited. There were contractual 
disputes between the companies and the government, which have not yet been resolved. 
 
The Comahue generators continued to seek application of the Salex Funds, which had 
reached $99 million at the end of December 2001, but had fallen to $70 million with the 
devaluation. They feared that the government would wish to use the money for other 
purposes such as compensating frozen tariffs.  
 
After much discussion, Resolution SE 1 (20 August 2002) allowed the Salex Funds to be 
used to pay for 100 per cent of the costs of capacitors on the Third and Fourth Lines in 
the Comahue corridor.
134 This special exemption to the 70 per cent rule was justified on 
the grounds that most of the cost of the expansion was denominated in US dollars for 
imported components, there was now a lack of credit for new investments, and the 
conversion of the Salex accounts (originally denominated in dollars) at 1.4 pesos/dollar 
had not reflected the real inflation at 3.6 pesos/dollar.  
 
In addition, for this expansion Resolution 1 replaced the concept of the fee by a 
maximum price, and specified that the contract would be for Construction only. This 
facilitated regulation of the interest rate for capital remuneration. Transener would 
Operate and Maintain the capacitors according to a tariff to be set by ENRE. The latter 
aspect reflected the provisions for an expansion proposed by a transmission company in 
its own substation under Resolution 208/1998. This expansion thus became a hybrid case: 
proposed by generators under the normal Public Contest method, but treated as a 
substation expansion initiated by a transmission company because only the construction 
element would be put out to public tender. 
 
The concept of a fee was also changed to a maximum price when other expansions 
initiated by the transmission company were renegotiated after devaluation. The maximum 
price was set partially in US dollars and the rest in pesos.
135 The fee excluding O&M is 
automatically recalculated each month in pesos according to the current exchange rate.  
 
6.2 Upgrade expansions 
 
In January 2003 the Secretary of Energy announced a one-off temporary process for so-
called Upgrade Expansions, of two types, to ensure that the networks continued to meet 
security conditions in the face of growth in demand.
136 Security expansions were to meet 
a specified minimum standard that the proportion of non-supplied energy should not 
                                                                                                                                                 
$12.5bn, of which 60% is represented by post-privatisation investments.” Pollitt 2004, p. 3, citing CAAISE 
2002, p 4. 
134 These capacitors at Choele-Choel and Olavarría cost $17m, paid in February 2004. 
135 For example, for the Campana transformer ENRE approved an amortisation period of 24 months, with a 
maximum price comprising one component of US $4.18 m and another of pesos 1.03 m. 
136 Resolution SE 1/2003, 2 January 2003   48
exceed 30 per cent of the demand in any area for ten days running. Adequacy expansions 
were to maintain voltage, and more generally to achieve or maintain the original design 
standards of the transmission equipment. These adequacy expansions were defined quite 
broadly to include several kinds of investment that fell outside the definition of security 
expansions as specified in Resolutions 208/1998 and 1/2002. The Resolution also 
incorporated a special chapter for regional transmission companies in Annex 16 of the 
Market Regulations. 
 
The onus was on the transmission companies (Transener and the regional sub-
transmission companies) to identify potential Upgrade projects (under this new 
resolution) and Security of supply projects (under Resolution 208/1998).
137  They should 
indicate them to CAMMESA before 30 January 2003, with a detailed description, 
explanation and estimate of cost.
138 CAMMESA was to check these, prioritise them, 
define the collection of projects that would minimise the risks to supply, and possibly 
propose alternative and more economic ways of dealing with the problems. ENRE was to 
give an opinion, and to indicate whether other related investments were in process. It 
would then be for the Secretary of Energy to decide which works to authorise.
139 Where 
appropriate there would be a competitive tender.  
 
The costs of investment, operation and maintenance would be allocated 70 per cent in 
proportion to peak demand and 30 per cent in proportion to payments as beneficiaries of 
the expansion (under the Public Contest methodology). This means that (e.g.) the cost to 
beneficiaries of the Bariloche scheme would now be 30 per cent of what it would have 
been previously (plus a small amount for the remaining 70 per cent shared across peak 
demand in the whole system).   
 
The Secretary of Energy decided that in the circumstances of the time it was opportune to 
use the uncommitted funds in the Salex Fund to help finance these transmission 
expansions. However, because the Salex Funds were earmarked for expansions to reduce 
congestion, they could only be loaned for these reliability projects. 
 
Within two months the Secretary of Energy reported on progress.
140 The transmission 
concessionaires had proposed projects and CAMMESA had ranked them.
141 For the 500 
kV network the Secretary of Energy approved three Security of Supply expansions (three 
transformers with a total cost of Arg $33m (pesos) or US $10.3m), and eight Upgrade 
                                                 
137 Resolution 334/2002 had extended Resolution 208/98 (at the request of CAMMESA) by approving a 
new type of security expansion, called ‘security scheme for frequency and voltage control on the 
interconnected system’. This type of expansion is complementary to other types of security projects 
(operation of security islands and black start). The Resolution also specified the rules for allocating the 
resulting charge to cover investment and O&M costs. 
138 Here and often elsewhere, strictly speaking the responsibility falls to the dispatch entity OED, which is a 
part of CAMMESA. 
139 Resolution SE 86 (30 January 2003) created a new Commission to advise the Secretary, comprising 
professionals from the Energy Secretariat, CAMMESA and ENRE. 
140 SE Resolution 106/2003, 28 February 2003 
141 ENRE had not commented except for noting that two projects had already been considered in the 
context of the tariff revisions of one of the concessionaires.   49
expansions (capacitors, reactors and other auxiliary devices costing Arg $ 33m  (pesos) or 
US $10.3m).
142 He also approved expansions to the 132 kV sub-transmission networks.  
 
6.3 The Federal Plan re-launched 
 
President Nestor Kirchner was elected on 27 April 2003. Tariffs to end-users remained 
frozen, achieved by frozen remuneration for regulated network activities and a reduction 
in generators’ income. This was said to be a transitory policy but without any deadline for 
ending it. From June 2003 onwards the exchange rate stabilised at just under 3 pesos to 
the US dollar. 
 
In June 2003 the government re-launched the Federal Transmission Plan for using the 
Federal Transmission Fund (that is, using the proceeds of the additional surcharge of 
$0.06/MWh).
143 It focused on those four of the five lines originally identified for which 
positive benefits had been calculated: 
-  Comahue – Cuyo interconnection (660 km) 
-  NOA-NEA (northwest – northeast) interconnection (1015 km) 
-  interconnection of the national system MEM with the Patagonia system MEMSP 
(354 km) 
-  Interconnection CUYO – NOA (Minera or Mining line with 3 sections) (555 km).  
   
The Government indicated that it would make its decision based on a variety of 
considerations, including the contribution from users or other sources. It gave first 
priority to the link with the Patagonia system, discussed earlier. A promotion contract 
(between the government and the private contributors that wanted to build the line) was 
signed 27 June 2003.
144 It is understood that the Federal Transmission Fund is 
contributing 69 per cent of the total cost and private investors (specifically Aluar, the 
aluminium factory in Patagonia) the remaining 31 per cent.
145  
 
For their part, the generators continued to be concerned about the government’s intention 
to use the Salex Funds for other purposes (including to subsidise end-user tariffs that had 
been held down by the pesification and price freeze). They were keen to propose projects 
                                                 
142 As noted above, the reserve transformer at Alicurá for Bariloche was top of the list of Security of Supply 
expansions, and the Henderson transformer rejected by the local distribution company was also included. 
143 SE 4 (13 June 2003) and SE 832 (7 November 2003). In view of the delays in implementing the Federal 
Plan of June 2000, the second of these Resolutions removed a deadline for using the Federal Fund for 
administrative procedures and consultancy services. (The previous deadline had been three years from the 
declaration of an open season or the commissioning date, whichever occurred first.) SE 830 (6 November 
2003) approved the segmentation of the Mining Line into shorter sections in order to improve the 
conditions for its development. Resolution 4/2003 provided clarifications and specific rules for the public 
tender process for Federal Plan lines in the context of the economic crisis. For example, it allowed the 
initiators of an expansion to buy materials on behalf of the relevant future transmission company before the 
COM contract was signed, with a view to avoiding the uncertainty of devaluation on the funds in the 
Federal Plan, which were denominated in pesos. 
144 SE 5/18 June 2003 
145 As with all public tenders since the Economic Emergency Law was put in force, it was said that the 
Government’s decision would also take account of buying Argentine materials. Some noted that since 
Aluar produced aluminium conductors it would presumably provide these materials for this line.   50
of more use to them while the Salex Fund was still available. From their perspective, the 
best use of the substantial funds in the Comahue corridor account was now the Fifth Line 
(Comahue- Cuyo). They therefore promoted this line, supported by the Federal Council 
and Transener.  
 




In November 2003 Law 25822 formally ratified the Federal Transmission Plan as 
developed in previous resolutions. In addition, it: 
-  provided that the resources received by CAMMESA corresponding to the Federal 
Electricity Plan, and those that Law 24065 put under the administration of the 
Federal Council, should be immediately put at the disposal of the Federal Council 
as funds corresponding to the Federal Transmission Fund; 
-  authorised the Secretary of Energy to take the regulatory steps necessary to start 
the works in the Federal Transmission Plan, in particular notifying the 180 days of 
‘open season’ for the Comahue – Cuyo line and the first (Mendoza – San Juan) 
tranche of the Mineral Line; 
-  provided that the rules covering exports of electricity to neighbouring countries 
should not adversely affect users in bordering provinces, either by modifying the 
nodal factor or by any other element that distorts the local electricity markets. In 
the same way the operation of buying and selling electricity energy to 
neighbouring countries would be subject to the national tax regime;
147 
-  entrusted the Secretary of Energy, with his counterpart in Chile, to study and 
evaluate a regulatory regime specifically for the interconnection between 
Argentina and Chile;
148 
                                                 
146 This is a 500 kV line from Puerto Madryn to Pico Truncado, just north of President Kirchner’s province 
of Santa Cruz. Although the line will be financed through the Federal Fund, there seems to be an 
expectation that financial support for the line will come directly from the national treasury. it seems 
difficult to identify significant benefits with this line, and there is an element of circularity in the 
justifications. In the absence of generation based in the oil fields near Pico Truncado, it is difficult to see 
who the users would be, but it would only be economic to develop and export generation from that area if 
the cost of transmission were near zero. 
147 In the absence of exports to Brazil, prices in the North-East nodes (an exporting area as a result of 
Yacyretá power station) would be about 12 per cent less than in Buenos Aires reflecting transmission 
losses. The introduction of exports to Brazil changed the direction of flow and increased prices in nodes 
near the border to about 15 per cent more than in Buenos Aires. Provinces in the North-East argued through 
the Federal Council and Congress for a different nodal pricing model to avoid this effect of increased 
exports. 
148 It is not clear whether this refers to an existing or future interconnection. 1) The 345 kV line built in the 
northwest never connected to the Argentine system. The owner (InterAndes) wanted such an 
interconnection but Transener and the northwest distribution companies were opposed since quality 
standards in the Great Northern system of Chile are very low, so the interconnection could reduce the 
performance of the Argentine system and increase penalties on the transmission and distribution 
companies. An identified problem was the lack of an agreement between both ISOs in order to set quality 
standards for interconnections between the two countries. 2) The Fifth Line (Comahue – Cuyo version) 
would make it easier and cheaper to interconnect with the central system of Chile. In the light of the 
experience just noted, the lack of a general agreement for interconnection quality standards could have 
been seen as an obstacle to future developments.   51
-  constituted a ‘Promotion Committee’ for the two lines above, comprising two 
representatives of each of the provincial governors of Mendoza and San Juan, a 
representative of all the distribution companies of each province, and a 
representative of the electricity generators of Comahue. The Committee will be 
authorised to take forward the works and to determine their general 
characteristics, in collaboration and with a view to achieving appropriate results 
and will be responsible for providing information to Congress about the 
development of these works.
  
 
The above provisions of the Law as passed by Congress were put into effect. There were 
also additional provisions:   
-  that the Salex Funds should be used exclusively to finance expansion of the 
transmission system;  
-  that the Salex Funds corresponding to the Comahue – Buenos Aires and Central 
Cuyo corridors would be applied in their entirety to financing the Comahue – 
Cuyo line and the first tranch (Mendoza – San Juan) of the Cuyo – NOA 
interconnection (the Mining Line), respectively, for the next 24 months. 
The President noted but did not approve these Salex provisions. They had been included 
to reassure the generators and secure their support for the Law.
 149 However, the 
government presumably wished to keep control of scarce funds and to maintain flexibility 
for their use for other purposes.
150  
 
The Government has indeed subsequently used the Salex Fund for other purposes, 
especially to handle the disparities between the actual generation costs and the frozen 
tariffs.  Figure 2, which charts the evolution of the Salex Fund over the decade since it 
was created in 1994, shows that in January 2004 US $50 million (about Arg $150m) was 
taken as compensation to the Liquid Fuels Reserve Fund.
151 
 
Thus, whereas the Salex Fund was once used to reinforce and facilitate decision-making 
by market participants, paying their own costs, now it is used to reinforce and facilitate 
decision-making by Government, with contributions invited from the private sector but 
taken into account in an unspecified way. 
 
                                                 
149 Law 25822 passed on 19 November 2003 and the other provisions including those ratifying the Federal 
Plan (initiated by Secretary of Energy resolutions SE 174, 175, 178 and 182 of 2000), which were a 
reassurance sought by the Federal Council, were approved by the President and put into effect 4 December 
2003. The provisions about the Salex Funds have not been put into effect.  
150 Some of these funds could be used to compensate generators for the frozen end-user tariffs. However, 
the generators opposed the use of these Funds for tariff compensation, fearing that using Salex Funds for 
this purpose would delay the structural adjustments in tariffs that were necessary after devaluation. 
Accordingly, they argued instead (together with the Federal Council) for using the Fund to develop the 
Fifth Line. 
151 This Fund was set up to compensate generators for the costs of liquid fuel needed in winter because of 
constraints on natural gas supply. These fuel costs are set by international markets in US dollars, while 
tariffs were frozen in Argentine pesos. It has also been said that the Salex Fund was used to pay a US$350 
million debt owed to various hydroelectric entities including the Binational company Yacyretá.
  IBL 
Troubled Company Reporter, Vol 4, Issue 249, 17 December 2003.   52
As at 31 December 2003 the Federal Transmission Fund stood at Arg $116.6m plus 
US $25.6m. This is not sufficient to finance all lines in the Federal Plan. The problem 
was much exacerbated after the devaluation, since investments are now only made if the 
government pays cash. For example, nearly five years after it was first proposed and 
endorsed, nothing has yet been done towards the Mining Line. Serious supply problems 




Meanwhile, on 24 August 2004 the government sent to Congress a draft bill creating a 
new Federal Public Utility Services Regime. Its preamble remarks that, at the time of 
privatisation (late 1989), “the bodies created to monitor compliance with the regulatory 
frameworks and the concessions and licences granted did not prove appropriate. On the 
other hand, the State’s conduct became self-damaging, as the State was deprived of 
income to which it was entitled and, at the same time, its expenditure soared. The aim of 
the bill is to address this issue, “as advised by international experience”, and also “to 
reinstate the State’s full exercise of its rights and compliance with its duties and 
obligations”. 
 
The bill introduces several new (and restrictive) conditions for concessions, licenses and 
permissions. These include, for example conflict resolution exclusively under Argentine 
jurisdiction, contracts required to be in local currency, and regulated tariffs calculated 
according to costs and a regulated return. Rates are to be fair and reasonable, and “the 
mean minimum rate must be an instrument to encourage economic development and the 
highest level of social equity”.  
 
As with all public service concessions, the Federal Government will explicitly introduce 
an investment plan for each concession.
 153 It is not yet clear how this will be 
implemented for electricity transmission companies, but undoubtedly increases the extent 
of regulation and central planning. 
 
 
                                                 
152 As noted above, In June 2004 the San Juan regulator announced that it would allow the costs of the 
500kV line to Mendoza (the first part of the Mining line expansion) to be passed through to end-users, in 
order to help to provide additional funding for the line. 
153 Article 5 entitled Duties of the State provides that “In order to foster the country’s economic 
development and a more equitable distribution of income, the State shall …(f) demand that execution of the 
investment plan ensure long-term supply of service with the most suitable technology;,,,.” Article 6 
provides that “Pursuant to the mandate of Article 5 of this Law, the Executive Branch of Government shall 
in all cases define the investment plan to be carried out during service provision, and shall specifically 
include it within the related contractual framework.”   53
Figure 2 Evolution of Salex Fund 1994-2004 














































































































































SALEX Comahue collected after 4th Line
SALEX Comahue collected before 4th Line
"Apartamientos" Account - Transener
Puelches & Henderson
capacitors 
September 1996 to August 1997 - $25.2m
Upgrade Expansions Fund 
May & July 2003 - $17.3m
(Res SE 01/2003)
Compensation to liquid 
fuels reserve fund
January 2004 - $49.8m
Choele Choel & Olavarría 
capacitors 











7.  Review of performance 
 
7.1 Transmission expansion 1992 to 2002 
 
What has been the overall record of transmission expansion since privatisation? Table 3 
shows the high-voltage transmission lines installed from 1992 to 2002. 
 
Table 3    Construction of 500 kV transmission lines in Argentina 1992 - 2002
154 
 
Year  Operator  Project           Length  
1993  Transener  Piedra del Águila grid interconnection         6 km 
1994  Transener  Piedra del Águila grid interconnection         6 km 
1994  EBY    Yacyretá – Rincón (3 x 3.6 km) grid intercon.    11 km 
1994  Yacylec  Rincón – Resistencia          267 km 
1994  L L Lata  Loma la Lata–Planicie Banderita grid intercon. 37 km 
1996  Litsa    Rincón – Salto Grande        506 km 
                                                 
154 Source: Mercados Energéticos. CAMMESA Annual Report 2002 gives a similar total length of line over 
the same period, but with different timings: 1993 251 km, 1994 279 km, 1996 592 km, 1999 52 km, 2000 
1303 km, total 2477 km. It is possible to reconcile the data to a large extent by assuming that some projects 
are entered a year or two earlier or later in one or other data set. If about 246 km from CAMMESA’s 1993 
total corresponds to pre-1987 investment (see note to Table 3 in Part One), there remains unexplained about 
25 km from CAMMESA’s 1996 total. The 1999 Rincón – Garabí lines (2 x 135 km) are not included in 
CAMMESA’s figures because they are considered “international transmission” and consequently are not 
part of the 500kV national grid.   54
1996  Litsa    Rincón – San Isidro            80 km 
1997  P P Leufú  P P Leufú – P Águila  grid interconnection      18 km 
1999  Transener  P Águila – Abasto (Fourth line)    1292 km 
1999  Transener  A Cajón – Chocón grid interconnection      52 km 
1999  InterAndes  Cobos - Atacama (Chile) 345 kV      409 km 
2000  Endesa   Rincón – Garabí (Brazil)        135 km 
2000  AES    Power plant grid grid interconnection         6 km 
2002  Endesa   Rincón – Garabí 2
nd circuit        135 km 
 
Total                  2960 km 
 
How is this performance to be evaluated? Overall, nearly 3000 km of new 500 kV lines 
built over ten years is an average of about 300 km per year. It is true that more 500 kV 
transmission lines were built before privatisation – nearly 400 km to 500 km per year, 
depending on the precise period taken.
155 But that was at a time when the system was 
being formed into an interconnected system. And the major line that did go ahead after 
privatisation was a particularly large and important investment.
156 So the length and 
character of lines built under the reformed transmission expansion arrangements was 
quite substantial. 
 
However, there are important qualifications. Three of the longer lines listed in Table 4 
were planned before privatisation and financed by the federal government as part of the 
development of Yacyretá hydro plant. A further two lines link the same plant with Brazil. 
The InterAndes line is separate from the interconnected system, and was financed by a 
Chilean generating company supplying energy to mining companies in the north of Chile. 
A further six lines, at most 18 m long, simply connect generating plants with the high-
voltage grid. The 52 km line from Agua del Cajón to Chocón served the same function. 
This leaves the Fourth Line as the only high-voltage (500 kV) line built under ‘standard’ 
Public Contest conditions (though there were several 132 kV lines and other types of 
transmission investment). 
 
But is this a sign of the inadequacy of the expansion arrangements? Part One of this paper 
presented evidence that the previous rate of transmission building was excessive. An 
achievement of the post-privatisation period was precisely to avoid the building of 
unnecessary lines. In a state of excess capacity the priority is to make better use of 
existing lines.  
 
What is the evidence on other types of investment in the transmission system? Table 4 
sets out ENRE’s summary of the transmission projects completed during 1994 to 2002. It 
ranks the projects in order of size (but does not include all the transmission lines in the 
above table). It shows that during this period a total of 186 new transmission projects 
were put into effect, with a total value of $837.3 m. Where information is available, some 
details of the investments are noted in the table. 
                                                 
155 6870 km from 1974 to 1987, an average of 491 km/yr over 14 years, or 382 km/yr if the period is 
extended to 1991. See Table 1 in Part One of this paper. 
156 See section 4.3 in Part One.   55
 
Table 4  Transmission projects completed during 1994 to 2002
157 
        Number  Value $m 
Transener system (500 kV)  
Comahue- Buenos Aires (4
th line) 1292 km 1999  PC      1  250 
Rincón (Yacyretá) - Salto Grande 506 km 1996  PC      1  135 
Rincón (Yacyretá) – Resistencia 267 km 1994  PC       1    70 
Henderson – Puelches capacitors 1996    PC      1    24 
Paso de la Patria – Sta Catalina 132kV link
158        1  c20 
Macachin substation (500/132kV)            1  c20 
Next three projects (average $13m)            3    38 
Agua del Cajón – Chocón 52 km 1999 
Ramallo (power plant interconnection) 2000 
Recreo capacitors 2000      PC 
Remaining 40 projects (average $2m)        40    83 
Total                  49  640 
 
6 Regional sub-transmission companies (mainly 132 kV) 
Three largest projects Transba (average $8m)          3    23 
Three largest projects Transnoa (average $6m)          3    17 
Next three largest projects Transnoa (average $4m)          3    12 
Next three largest projects Transba (average $3m)          3      9 
Next three largest projects Transnoa (average $2)          3      7 
Remaining projects (average $1m)          122  129 
Total                  137  197     
 
Overall Total                186  837     
 
About a quarter of these projects (49) were within Transener’s jurisdiction, related 
primarily to the 500 kV system, but they accounted for just over three-quarters of the 
total value ($640.2m). The Fourth Line and two other long lines (listed as costing $250m, 
$135m and $70m respectively) accounted for 79 per cent of this amount. The next six 
projects in size ranged from $24m to about $10m. The remaining 40 high voltage (500 
kV) projects cost $83m in aggregate, an average of just over $2m each.  
 
The other three quarters of the total number of projects (137), accounting for just under a 
quarter of the total value ($197m), were carried out within the areas of the six regional 
sub-transmission companies operating primarily at 132 kV. The projects were evidently 
smaller than in the 500 kV system, the largest being about $10m. The largest 15 projects 
from the two most active systems accounted for $68m of the total value, an average of 
$4.5m each. The remaining 122 projects therefore averaged about $1m each. 
 
                                                 
157 Source: ENRE Annual Report 2002, ch. 3 pp. 49-55. Some cost figures have been deduced from text 
there and from other data. PC denotes Public Contest mechanism used. As also noted later, it is not clear 
that this list is complete. 
158 It is not clear why this 132 kV line is listed as in Transener’s 500 kV system.   56
Subtracting the major lines from the investments in the 500 kV system suggests that other 
investments totalled over $100m during this period. In particular, there was substantial 
investment in better control systems, to expand the existing capacity more economically 
than by building new transmission lines. There was also nearly $200m of investment in 
the regional sub-transmission networks. 
 
To illustrate the change in emphasis on investment, over the period 1993 to 2003 the 
length of transmission lines increased by 20 per cent, main transformers by 21 per cent, 
compensators by 27 per cent and substations by 37 per cent, whereas series capacitors 
increased by 176 per cent. As a result, transmission capacity limits increased by 105 per 
cent, more than sufficient to meet the increase in system demand of over 50 per cent.
159 
 
Table 5 shows that the number of expansion projects generally increased over time, at 
least until the crisis at the end of 2001. So too did the value of these projects, after 
distinguishing separately the three largest 500 kV lines in Transener’s area. Note that in 
2002, after the crisis and devaluation, the number and value of investments decreased 
sharply. 
 
Table 5  Transmission expansion projects over time 
 
Year    1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Total 
 
Number of projects 
 
Transener  2    9  5    5    5    6    5    9    3    49 
Regional Cos  0    5  4    8  18  26  20  36  20  137 
Total    2  14  9  13  23  32  25  45  23  186 
 
Value of projects $m 
 
3 major lines  70    0  135    0    0  250    0      0    0  455 
Other work    5  14    28  10  24    23  34    40    7  185 
Transener  75  14  163  10  24  273  34    40    7  640 
Regional Cos    0    1      3  12  29    49  23    63  17  197 
Total    75  15  166  22  54  321  57  103  24  837 
 
7.2 Competition in transmission 
 
                                                 
159 Transener slide presentation, 2003. R.Sanz, 2004, has slightly different calculations for 1992-2002 but 
the same overall conclusion. Transmission capacity increased in the same proportion as did demand, 
namely 60 per cent. Half the increase reflected new investment in 500 kV lines (an increase of 30 per cent) 
while the other half was consequent on the introduction of supplementary control devices in the main 
corridors. As a result of the greater efficiency of control, the ratio of kilometres of EHV lines to load 
decreased by 25 per cent (put another way, the average load factor increased by about a third). This made 
better use of existing facilities and reduced charges to generators and other users.   57
Leaving aside the issue of what expansions were decided upon, to what extent was there 
competition to construct, operate and maintain transmission expansions, and what were 
the effects of this? 
 
Of the 25 proposed public contest expansions listed in the Appendix, 12 have gone to 
competitive bids. (The other proposals have been rejected, suspended or are being 
renegotiated.) Of these 12 we have details of the bidding in 7 cases. One expansion 
attracted only 1 bid, three attracted two bids, two attracted three bids, and one – the 
Fourth Line – attracted four bids.
160  
 
Setting aside substation expansions proposed by the transmission company that owns 
them, 10 expansions have been put out to competitive tender. The Table in the Appendix 
indicates that all but the Fourth Line has been won by or with a new independent 
transmission company.
161 Transener won the expansion proposed by itself, to reconfigure 
its own Ezeiza substation, but the tender nonetheless attracted three bids.  
 
The Fourth Line was perhaps the most dramatic example of competition. There were four 
bidders including Atalaya Energy (a consortium formed by the generators themselves) 
and Transener. These four submitted a total of 13 bids, since Transener offered two 
alternatives to its basic offer and its main competitor offered seven alternatives. This 
reflected a desire to offer as keen a fee as possible, including by the use of new 
technologies that had not yet been applied in Argentina. Although the possibilities of 
these technologies were discussed between the generators and constructors, the tender 
documents were not entirely clear and the bidders preferred to include more than one 
option in order avoid any risk of rejection. In the event the generators accepted the lowest 
fee bid, from Transener, which involved an innovative Cross Rope technology. The value 
of this bid was $24.521m, which was only fractionally below the lowest rival bid of 
$24.999m. 
 
The record suggests that, although there has been less investment in transmission lines 
than before the reform, this has not been at the expense of efficiency. The longest new 
line that has been built is a very substantial one; there has been valuable investment in 
enhancing system control; and there has been a significant improvement in the 
performance of the transmission system over the period from privatisation to the 
economic crisis.  
 
There are also additional merits of the Public Contest process. For example, it has 
incentives not only to use known methods to improve reliability but also to discover new 
                                                 
160 With the exception of the Fourth Line, there is no obvious correlation between number of bids and size 
of expansion or type of work. The single bid was for a 132 kV line value $10.6m, the double bids were for 
capacitors and 132 kV lines average value $7.6m, and the triple bids were for a 132 kV line and substation 
reconfiguration averaging $8m. 
161 These are Yacylec, LITSA, Cobra (5 expansions), Siemens/Cobra, and ABB/Transener, The Appendix 
also shows that the amortization period has varied from 15 years down to 1. Not surprisingly, the period is 
generally longer for larger investments (say over $50m) although the periods for investments below this 
value show more dispersion.   58
opportunities for improving performance, with consequent improved information about 
the transmission system.
162 The arrangement also facilitates financing of large projects.
163 
 
7.3 Reductions in cost 
 
If competition to provide transmission expansions is a reality, what effects has it had? It 
seems to have secured significant reductions over time in the cost of building and 
operating new lines. A commonly cited statistic is that the first three lines, successively 
of length about 300 km, 500 km and 1300 km, were all secured for nearly the same fee – 
about $2m per month or $24m per year.
164 It began to be said in Argentina that a new 
transmission line costs $24m whatever the length. Taken at face value, the quadrupling in 
line length for the same price implies a cost reduction of about 77 per cent. However, the 
calculation is a little more complex because other equipment and some exceptional costs 
were involved as well. It is therefore worth trying to sort this out.
165  
 
Before privatisation the companies AyE and Hidronor would use a budget estimate of 




The first major line to be built after privatisation was the 267 km Rincón – Resistencia 
line for Yacyretá power station. This was originally estimated to cost $228,000/km, 
consistent with previous practice. The winning bid by Yacylec was a monthly fee of 
nearly $2.3m over 15 years, present value about $197m.
167 However, the tender included 
the cost of building the substation at Rincón, and there were exceptional costs because 
the line had to cross the 3 km wide Parana river near Resistencia. Table 5 above (based 
on the ENRE report) puts the cost of the line itself at $70m. Even this adjustment implies 
an average cost of $267,000/km, greater than the usual estimates before privatisation. 
Possible explanations are that the ‘client’ was the joint-government-owned Yacyretá 
station, for whom lowest cost may not have been the highest priority; bidding took place 
                                                 
162 “Capacity prices in the outlying regions were penalized if the connections to the market were not 
reliable, thereby adding a price signal to encourage participants to improve system reliability. Consultants 
would crawl the system looking for places to install things that would improve stability and eliminate 
constraints, or that would improve the unreliable links. You end up with a lot of people knowing quite a lot 
about the transmission system.” J D Roark, personal communication to Prof W Hogan. 
163 “I have always admired the transmission enhancement feature of the Argentine market. It needs 
financial rights to make it complete, but it works as it is. Though it is facilitated by the relatively simple 
spider-radial nature of the Argentine system, there are some very important features of this procedure that 
modern-day proposals lack. In particular, when a line is accepted as a legitimate system procurement by 
CAMMESA and by (at least 70% of) the beneficiaries, it takes on an official stature. It will have the same 
revenue-collection status as any regulate line; its costs will be billed out over time, and they will be 
collected under the existing transmission tariff. The credit of the market stands behind the project, and this 
makes the project financeable. … In short, for me it stands out as a better thought-out idea than most of the 
modern day proposals.” J D Roark, personal communication, 23 May 2003. 
164 E.g. Woolf 2003a, p. 266, Woolf 2000b.   
165 The following notes reflect calculations made earlier by R Sanz. 
166 Source: R Sanz, personal communication  
167 Figures of $2.4m and $205m in the Appendix include the three short 3.6 km lines connecting the plant 
with the local substation.   59
during the privatisation process (it was completed in 1994) so Transener was not able to 
bid; and there was limited competition for the tender.  
 
The second major line was the 506 km Rincón – Salte Grande line in 1996, also for 
Yacyretá power station. The winning bid was a monthly fee of $1.8m over 10 years, 
present value about $131m. Table 5 (per ENRE) puts the total cost at $135m. But in this 
case the ENRE figure seems to comprise about $49 m for a substation and other works 
and about $86m for the line. Dividing the latter by the length 506 km implies an average 
cost of $170,000/km. This is a significant reduction on the previous cost, and reflects 
stronger competition. It was not thought that Transener could lose this contract, but the 
winning bidder was the construction company Litsa, which thereby became the second 
independent transmission company in Argentina. 
 
The third major project was the 1292 km Fourth Line, approved in 1997. The winning 
tender was a monthly fee of $2m over 15 years. However, this was after reducing the 
total cost by $80m from the Salex Fund. Table  (per ENRE) puts the total cost at $250m 
before application of the Salex Fund. Here too there was a substation and other works 
estimated to cost about $82m with the line costing about $168m. Dividing the latter by 
the 1292 km length implies a cost of about $130,000/km.
168 The price reduction reflected 
an active concern by buyers (mainly generators) to minimise their costs, and fierce 
competitive bidding by construction companies in which Transener was keen not to cede 
its leading position. 
 
To summarise, the cost seems to have fallen from the range $230,000/km to $267,000/km 
in the period up to 1994 to about $130,000/km in 1997. Thus, a more accurate conclusion 
is that, under the impact of private ownership and competition, the cost of building 500 
kV transmission lines roughly halved.  
 
7.4 Analysis of expansions by method used 
 
Many of the transmission expansion arrangements put in place at the time of privatisation 
of the power sector in 1992 in principle still apply. However, the freezing of electricity 
tariffs in February 2002 following the crisis and devaluation of the peso has essentially 
precluded normal regulatory processes. The private sector now generally sees new 
investment as too risky. Nonetheless, there have been about eight years of experience 
under relatively normal conditions. 
 
Table 6 shows that under 10 per cent by number of the expansion projects (16) were 
financed by the Public Contest method. A quarter (45) were financed by Contract 
between Parties. Over 60 per cent (118) were Minor expansions.
169 The remaining 4 per 
cent (7) proceeded under Article 31. However, the Public Contest expansions were by far 
the biggest by value, accounting for two-thirds of the expansions by value ($538m). 
Contract between Parties accounted for a quarter ($217m). Minor expansions accounted 
                                                 
168 On the bidding and general context see Galetovic and Inostroza 2004. 
169 Of these, 113 were Minor Expansions by Contract between Parties and 5 were Other Minor Expansions. 
There was no difference in the average value of these two sub-categories.   60




This means that the average sizes of expansions were Public Contest $34m, Contract 
between Parties $5m, Article 31 $1.7m and Minor expansions $0.6m. 
 
With a small number of projects of differing sizes, overall averages can be misleading. 
ENRE reports that, of the nine largest projects, five were built using the Public Contest 
method and four used Contracts between Parties. We may calculate that the four largest 
Public Contest projects had a total cost of $479 m. This means that the remaining 12 
Public Contest projects totalled $60m, an average of $5m each. In other words, apart 
from the four largest projects, the 12 remaining Public Contest projects had the same 
average size as the 45 projects by Contract Between Parties. 
 
Table 6  Evolution of projects over time, by method of approval
171 
 
Year    1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Total 
 
Number of projects 
Public Contest 1  0  2  0  1  2  2  8  0    16 
Contract BP  0  1  2  7  6  11  8  5  5    45 
Minor projects 0  12  3  5  16  19  14  31  18  118 
Article 31  1  1  2  1  0  0  1  1  0      7 
Total    2  14  9  13  23  32  25  45  23  186 
 
Value of projects $m 
Public Contest  
- 3 majors  70  0  135  0  0  250  0  0  0  454 
- other PC  0  0  24  0  2  1  16  41  0    84 
Contract BP  0  0  3  16  45  62  32  41  18  217 
Minor projects 0  13  3  5  7  9  8  19  6    70 
Article 31  5  2  1  1  0  0  1  3  0    12 
Total    75  15  166  22  54  321  57  103  24  837 
 
 
The Appendix provides some further detail on the major expansions using the Public 
Contest method. Most of these have already been mentioned in Parts One or Two of this 
paper.  
 
8.  Economists’ concerns about a market approach 
 
It has been argued that merchant transmission investment can be shown to be efficient 
under a restricted set of assumptions, but that in reality those assumptions generally do 
                                                 
170 It is not clear that ENRE’s figures include all the Article 31 expansions – for example, the 202 km 220 
kV line from Tucumán to the Australian-owned goldmine in the Andes. 
171 Source: ENRE 2002 Annual Report.   61
not obtain.
172 These authors also acknowledge that essentially the same is true of 
regulated transmission investment.
173 The question therefore arises: how do these 
alternative methods perform in practice, in the kinds of conditions actually observed? 
 
Argentine policy does not involve merchant investment in the same sense as, say, 
Australian merchant transmission.
174 Nevertheless, the kinds of assumptions identified as 
key ones for merchant transmission could well be important for a policy that bases 
investment decisions on the decisions of users instead of regulators. It is therefore 
relevant to examine how the Argentine framework for transmission expansion deals with 
the potentially problematic conditions identified by the above authors.  
 
8.1 Imperfections in wholesale energy markets that may distort investment because 
prices do not reflect marginal costs.  
 
Argentina has adopted a vigorous structural policy to prevent market power in the 
wholesale markets, by selling generation plants separately, and also by prescribing 
bidding on the basis of cost. Market power is not reported as a significant problem. In 
fact the generators in Comahue used the Fourth Line as a means of competing more 
effectively with generators in Buenos Aires 
 
8.2 Lumpy transmission investments that may lead to underinvestment to avoid 
spoiling market prices, or to premature investment to pre-empt new entry. 
 
Lumpiness and size were not an issue with the Fourth Line: 500 kV was always the 
envisaged capacity and there seems to have been no discussion of a 132 kV line (or a 
larger one) instead. Insofar as consumers or distribution companies are involved in the 
decision as users, they have no interest in under-investment to maintain high prices or to 
pre-empt new entry. As a result of the nodal pricing mechanism in Argentina, and the 
application of the Area of Influence method, generators in the main supply areas have 
been the main decision-makers, and they would suffer from under-investment in 
transmission since it would lead to congestion and lower prices for them. The main 
concern in Argentina (albeit unjustified) has been delayed rather than premature 
transmission investment, at least under the Public Contest method. The present paper 
suggests that installation of the NW capacitors may be been premature, but this seems to 
be explained by unexpected developments there, and is not considered to have pre-
empted new entry. 
 
                                                 
172 Joskow and Tirole 2003, 2004, also Joskow 2003. 
173 “In principle, a regulated Transco model can deal directly with issues associated with lumpy investment, 
market power in wholesale power markets, gaming behavior of merchant investors, stochastic attributes of 
transmission capacity, and avoids the need to separate transmission ownership and system operations. 
However, a regulated Transco model will necessarily confront inefficiencies resulting from asymmetric 
information and political interference in planning and investment processes and may be less effective than a 
merchant model in providing the high powered incentives that lead to the identification of innovative 
transmission investment options, construction costs minimization, and efficient tradoffs between generation 
and transmission investments.” Joskow and Tirole 2004, p. 34. 
174 Littlechild 2003, 2004.   62
8.3 Stochastic capacity that may complicate the defining of property rights. 
 
Stochastic capacity and the definition of property rights were not an issue with the 
transmission expansion scheme as initially implemented. After concerns were then 
expressed about the lack of property rights, steps were taken to remedy this. Concerns 
then focused on who should receive the proceeds of the property rights on the existing 
lines, and on the potential conflict with the subsequent Government’s Federal 
Transmission Plan, but not on problems of defining the property rights with stochastic 
capacity. The policy instituting property rights was derogated shortly after it was 
introduced, so there is no evidence on its operation. Whether property rights were 
actually needed is unclear, since the presumption that economic expansions were not 
being implemented no longer seems to be valid. 
 
8.4 Conflicts of interest and moral hazard problems, and associated inefficiencies, in 
relation to dispatch and maintenance, as a result of the separation of ownership and 
system control.. 
 
An early decision in Argentina was to make scheduling the responsibility of an 
Independent System Operator (CAMMESA), separate from transmission companies as 
well as generation companies. In the event there have been no allegations of 
inefficiencies in scheduling. Allowing rival companies to maintain their own expansions 
might have led to problems, but the regulatory framework provided for incumbent 
transmission companies to advise on the technical implications of a new line, gave them 
responsibility for technical compatibility and supervising the installation of a line 
installed by others, and provided for them to be adequately remunerated for this. There 
were some teething problems with the bid for the Fourth Line, given the conflicting 
interests of Transener, but these were satisfactorily resolved with the assistance of the 
regulator ENRE.
175 Proponents of expansions often invited Transener itself to take 
responsibility for maintenance of certain equipment.
176 A later modification to the 
regulatory framework provided for the owner of a substation to propose, operate and 
maintain investments needed to maintain quality of supply, and this facilitated several 
expansions. In sum, where there were potential conflicts and moral hazard problems, they 
were acknowledged and dealt with. 
 
8.5 Loop flows that complicate the problem of defining and allocating property 
rights. 
 
Loop flows were not a significant problem in Argentina for two reasons: first, loop flows 
are more problematic in meshed networks, whereas the high voltage transmission 
Argentine network was (initially) almost entirely radial; second, there was no attempt 
initially to define property rights for each line. This is not to say that loop flows are non-
                                                 
175 Galetovic and Inostroza 2004. See the discussion in Part One. 
176 A significant example is the 52 km 500 kV line between Agua del Cajón and Chocón, developed under 
Article 31. A COM contract to this effect was signed between the promoter Capex and Transener, as 
mentioned in the preliminaries of Resolution ENRE 761 (11 June 1998).   63
existent in Argentina,
177 and the designers of the regulatory framework, as transmission 
engineers, were well aware of them. However, loop flow did not impact significantly on 
what they envisaged as the immediate investment decisions involving generators in 
Comahue and the northwest. Nor was it an economic investment priority in the early 
1990s to join other radial lines that might create further loops. It was therefore more 
sensible to leave the issue for resolution in the light of experience. In the event, there 
have been discussions and proposals to reform various aspects of the regulatory 
framework, some of which have been implemented, and there is also exploration of how 
far the present Area of Influence method can be adapted to deal with loop flows. On the 
whole, however, loop flows per se do have not been a focus of concern. 
 
8.6 Coordination problems between market participants and transmission operators 
whereby  
 
a) for example, expansions are announced but not implemented.  
 
The authors suggest posting a bond to prevent such actions. The regulatory framework in 
Argentina requires that anyone proposing a price for a construction, operation and 
maintenance contract accompanying a Public Contest expansion should post a bond to 
guarantee that it honours this price. However, there does not seem to be evidence of 
proponents announcing transmission lines but not implementing them (though some 
expansions have of course been voted down or halted by opposition of provincial 
regulators). 
 
b) negotiations between market participants are unable to resolve problems 
because of transactions costs, asymmetric information, absence of future players, 
non-excludability of winners and free-riding, and hold-up of potential losers. 
 
As explained, the Fourth Line is a now-classic case where negotiations between market 
participants in fact were successful in resolving coordination problems and taking 
forward the investment. Transactions costs were not an obstacle there, and have not been 
reported in other cases. There were (initially at least) asymmetric expectations about the 
future as between market participants, but these were intrinsic in a situation of 
uncertainty, and equally applicable to the regulatory body. They were resolved (to the 
extent necessary) by discussion between the parties. The original framework provided for 
minor expansions, where the potential transactions costs might be high in relation to the 
value of the investment, to be taken forward by the transmission company. In 1998 this 
principle was extended to major investments for quality and security of supply. Also, 
owners were given the ability and incentive to propose expansions in the specific case of 
substations, where owners might be better informed than users.  
 
The proposed (but later cancelled) modification to introduce congestion rights did bear on 
potential problems associated with non-excludability, free-riding and hold-up, and the 
modification to introduce ‘risk-bearing expansions’ did bear on potential problems 
                                                 
177 There are loops in the northeast corridor as a result of the pre-existent transmission system developed 
for Salto Grande in the 1980’s and the expansions developed for Yacyretá in the 1990’s.   64
associated with the absence of future players. Whether such problems did in fact preclude 
significant economic investment in transmission is unclear but there are no obvious 
examples of such precluded investment. There were concerns that future generators might 
benefit from expansions supported by existing generators. However, the Public Contest 
mechanism ensured that as beneficiaries they had to pay their allocated share of the costs 
of all approved investment. Apart from issues associated with usage versus benefit they 
did not benefit from transmission investments paid for by others.  
 
A few transmission investments were voted down, but not because some users were free 
riders on the investment of others, or because of failure of beneficiaries to agree. Rather, 
they were halted by opposition of provincial regulators, in one main case on the basis that 
the expansion was not worthwhile. Other provincial regulators are reported to have been 
concerned about expansions if they meant higher prices to customers. There is some 
uncertainty whether ENRE and provincial regulators enforced the penalty system to 
provide the intended incentive, or provided the intended revenues to finance transmission 
reinforcement. Yet in BA province (and prospectively elsewhere), negotiations between 
market participants and provincial regulators have overcome even these regulatory and 
government obstacles. 
 
c) gaming between merchant investment projects whereby (for example) there are 
complementary projects undertaken by different entities along successive lengths 
of a line, and the remuneration based on price differentials is such that “each 
would like to have a capacity slightly lower than the other. Hence none dares to 
move first as the other will be sure to collect the entire rent.”
178 
 
The Argentine mechanism depends on users proposing and approving the projects, 
requires technical and economic approval of the ISO and the regulator, and provides for 
remuneration that is not based on such price differentials. Users have an incentive to look 
at complementary projects together, and (though this may not seem consistent with the 
original philosophy) the regulator also has to be satisfied that a proposal is economic.
 
Such an inefficient outcome as described has not occurred, and it seems inconceivable 
that it would do so. 
 
8.7 Lack of forward markets for a long-term investment raise problems of 
financing, credibility vis-à-vis projects with shorter lead times, and are vulnerable 
to regulatory uncertainty and opportunism. 
 
The regulatory framework takes pains to prevent delays to transmission investments, for 
example by setting strict limits on the times within which CAMMESA, the incumbent 
companies and the regulator ENRE must discharge their duties. It has been argued that 
the Public Contest method actually facilitates the financing of large and long-term 
investments. By embodying remuneration in a series of individual, voluntarily agreed and 
legally binding contracts between users and proponents, these investment projects are less 
vulnerable to regulatory uncertainty and opportunism than if they were subject to periodic 
(five-yearly) regulatory appraisals of allowed costs and returns. 
                                                 




To summarise, various concerns have been raised about the efficiency of merchant 
transmission investment under realistic assumptions. These concerns would be 
problematic if they applied also to the Public Contest method. However, in practice they 
do not seem to have been problematic in the case of transmission expansions in 
Argentina. There are various reasons for this. To some extent these concerns are less 
relevant because the Argentine network is more radial than other networks. To some 
extent these problems were foreseen and dealt with by consciously designed elements of 
the regulatory framework. And to some extent these problems do not seem to characterise 
the way that market participants act in practice. While it is important to examine any 
regulatory framework in the light of such concerns, Argentine experience suggests they 




9.1 Summary of Part One 
 
In privatising its electricity sector in 1992, Argentina adopted innovative arrangements 
with respect to transmission regulation. The incumbent transmission company was 
forbidden to initiate expansions in capacity. With the exception of minor investments, 
users were to propose and finance such expansions, either by agreement (the Contract 
Between Parties method) or by using a prescribed voting scheme (the Public Contest 
method, with votes based on usage in a defined Area of Influence).  
 
It is widely held that this particular policy innovation has been unsuccessful. Most 
importantly, it is held to have delayed by many years a much-needed Fourth Line into 
Buenos Aires.  
 
Part One of this paper explained that the regulatory arrangements for transmission 
expansion in Argentina reflected a strong and plausible belief, based on much previous 
experience, that a traditional framework of regulation would fail to deliver the improved 
efficiency that would be crucial to maximising economic development in that country. 
Closer examination shows that the Fourth Line was delayed by only a year and a half 
rather than by many years. Far from being much-needed,it was economic, both at the 
time it was first proposed under the new arrangements, and indeed when later 
implemented. The system of extracting congestion revenues (rather than passing through 
local prices to local consumers) provided an additional incentive on market participants 
to eliminate this loss of congestion revenues. This together with the use of the Salex 
mechanism for offsetting the costs of construction, seems to have been primarily 
responsible for making the Line privately profitable. Deferring the Fourth Line 
investment was therefore economically beneficial rather than costly, and also enabled 
construction costs to be reduced by introducing a more competitive bidding mechanism. 
   66
9.2 Summary of Part Two 
 
Other criticisms of the Argentine approach are that it failed to deliver needed expansions 
to improve quality and reliability of supply, particularly as a result of reluctance to 
participate by distribution companies; that the Area of Influence method failed to reflect 
benefits to users properly; that investment was deterred by a lack of transmission 
property rights; and that there were problems in negotiating and securing consensus 
among the parties involved. Accordingly, Argentina has been held up as an example of 
“how not to do it” with respect to transmission regulation. More generally, it is used to 
suggest that conventional methods of regulation are preferable to methods that give a 
greater role to market participants. 
 
Part Two of this paper has shown that these other criticisms and perceptions are incorrect.  
 
The regulatory arrangements were modified in 1998 to allow a greater role for the 
transmission company, the system operator CAMMESA and the regulator ENRE in 
proposing and authorising expansions to improve quality and maintain reliability, and in 
substations. Several such expansions were made. Participation by distribution companies 
may have been hindered by lack of clarity about funds and obligations, but these 
ambiguities could have been resolved by provincial governments, who on occasion were 
responsible for preventing or delaying proposed expansions. Calculations do not suggest 
that (before or after the 1998 modification) there was a failure to make economic quality 
or reliability expansions in the high-voltage 500 kV system. 
 
In 1998/99 the government examined experience in the sector to date and introduced a 
‘second round of reforms’. This included the introduction of financial transmission rights, 
and a new method for facilitating Risk expansions. No change was deemed appropriate to 
the Area of Influence method: no better system of votes was identified, it was thought not 
to be a limitation with the introduction of transmission rights, and there is no evidence 
that the method prevented economic expansions from taking place.  
 
Fewer major transmission lines were built after privatisation than before. Most were 
government-sponsored lines from a particular powerstation (Yacyretá) jointly-owned 
with another government, and other international links. There were also several 
connections to new power stations. After allowing for these, the Fourth Line was perhaps 
the only significant line to be built using the Public Contest method. But this was not a 
failure of that method. It reflected the excessive investment before privatisation. It was 
more economic to increase the capacity of the existing lines, notably by investing in new 
control equipment. The Public Contest method did this, and thereby increased efficiency. 
Transmission capacity limits doubled, sufficient to meet a 50 per cent increase in 
demand, with investment increases in the range one fifth to one third. Transmission load 
factor increased by about one third, and line construction costs halved. 
 
The negotiations between market participants over the Fourth Line were not problematic 
and nor did they preclude consensus. In fact the generators that voted against the initial 
proposal worked actively with the proponents to develop a proposal that all could   67
support, and this succeeded. Concerns have been raised about merchant transmission, 
associated with market imperfections, lumpy investments, conflicts of interest, loop flow 
problems, coordination problems, regulatory uncertainty, and other factors. These 
concerns either did not apply to the user-driven arrangements for transmission expansion 
in Argentina, or were dealt with by appropriate provisions in the regulatory framework. 
  
These developments were prematurely halted when the original aims of the regulatory 
framework were complemented then in practice largely superceded by a different 
philosophical approach. In late 1999 the outgoing Government proposed to increase the 
surcharge on electricity sales in order to finance additional regional expansions. A new 
government in 2000 enthusiastically took up this idea and withdrew the recent ‘second 
round reforms’ as potentially inconsistent with its Federal Transmission Plan. A Federal 
Transmission Fund “which shall have as its objective the financing of transmission 
expansions that the Secretary of Energy identifies as financeable” would now be used to 
implement policy “indispensably driven by the goal of sponsoring growth and 
development of the sector, the positive effects of which will propagate themselves 
throughout the rest of the economy”.  
 
In practice this meant a major expansion in each regional area, chosen by the 
Government with the advice of provincial representatives. Since the economic crisis in 
2001/2, private investment has reduced and the role of the Government has increased 
further. In 2003 the Government funded a program of Upgrade Expansions, chosen by 
itself with the advice of CAMMESA. These were financed by the uncommitted funds in 
the Salex Fund that was once used to facilitate and reinforce decision-making by market 
participants under the Public Contest method. However, funding constraints have limited 
the implementation of the Federal Transmisson Plan. A new Public Services Bill 
proposes numerous restrictions on concessions, an increased role for regulation, and a 
government-specified investment plan in each contract. 
 
9.3 Economics and politics 
 
The initial mechanism for transmission expansion in Argentina has been modified, not 
because it was failing to produce an economically efficient outcome, but because (in a 
changing political climate) it was not considered to produce a politically acceptable one. 
It seems no exaggeration to say that the novel form of transmission regulation established 
in 1992 was resisted, then supplemented and effectively replaced, precisely because it 
was economically efficient. That is, despite some teething difficulties with the method, 
transmission expansions generally took place where users considered the benefits 
outweighed the costs, and not otherwise. Expansions did not take place according to 
political preferences or “national objectives” of stimulating growth in particular regions 
or interconnecting particular areas of the country (at higher voltages than the load flow 
would indicate). 
  
A conventional role for regulation might have facilitated the achievement of such 
political and national objectives. Certainly, the active stance of the regulatory body 
ENRE in criticising the Public Contest method suggests that a conventional role for   68
regulation would have led to more and sooner transmission expansions, particularly large 
expansions in outlying regions. But this would have been costly, and it would also have 
given greater rein to political, managerial and special-interest group objectives rather than 
to economic or customer-oriented ones. In 1992 Argentina made a conscious choice to 
reject the conventional role for regulation, based on long experience and a realistic 
expectation of how regulation would actually work in practice. It gave a greater role to 
users instead of regulators. This worked well until it was effectively replaced, not 
because it had failed with respect to economic objectives, but because the new 
government wished to encourage transmission expansions to meet such “national 
objectives”. 
 
9.4 Implications for further research and policy 
 
What are the implications of these two papers for future research and policy? They 
suggest that it is insufficient for economic analysis simply to characterise the ‘efficient 
outcome’ and identify various ways in which a market approach could fail to meet it,. 
Experience in Argentina suggests this is misleading in two main respects. First, evidence 
from before and after the reform is that regulation and government have their own 
objectives, and the outcome of conventional regulation is likely to be far from efficient 
(in the conventional sense of maximising the aggregate net present value of benefits). 
Second, evidence from the period when the reform was operative is that the feared 
market failures did not apply, and the for the most part the outcomes seemed near to 
economic efficiency. The two best-known exceptions were attributable to actions or 
interventions by central and provincial government.
179 
 
For policy, the obvious questions are whether the distinctive and successful aspects of 
transmission expansion policy in Argentina are applicable elsewhere. Putting proposed 
new lines and investments out to tender has reduced costs there without undue problems, 
so should it not be applied in other countries? Or will an RPI-X or incentive price cap 
approach ensure adequate efficiency? And how far does the success of such a tendering 
policy depend on the actual or potential availability of competitors in construction? 
Allowing users to determine expansion has also proved effective and efficient – would it 
work in other countries, and particularly in less developed countries than Argentina? 
Transactions costs are surely not a central issue here: they apply to both methods in all 
countries. It might be argued that market institutions are weaker in many developing 
countries, but so too are regulatory and government institutions.  
 
An issue for both economists and policymakers is how best to deal with the conflicting 
pressures for ‘economic’ and ‘non-economic’ objectives. It is conventional to assume that 
the only aim is consumer sovereignty, implying economic efficiency. However, it is 
apparent that to a greater or lesser extent governments also seek other objectives related 
to (e.g.) income distribution, alleviation of market power, and regional considerations. In 
Argentina, as in Australia, governments clearly want to pursue both economic and non-
                                                 
179 Specifically, these were the creation of congestion revenues and to a lesser extent their use via Salex 
Funds to halve the cost of the Fourth Line, and the opposition of the provincial governments to the reserve 
transformer in Bariloche.    69
economic objectives. Should arrangements for transmission expansion, and the regulatory 
framework generally, seek to accommodate and indeed promote such non-economic 
objectives as legitimate expressions of the public will? Or should they seek to limit their 
influence as essentially self-serving political pressures that are against the long-term 
interests of consumers generally? 
 
The introduction of market-related transmission expansions has exposed the limited 
economic case for some of the larger expansions, and driven government back towards 
regulated investment subsidised by users generally. Whether this is viewed as desirable 
or undesirable depends in part on the view taken on the earlier questions. In either case, 
economists need to consider how best to accommodate and analyse these different 
objectives in economic models and in regulatory policy.  
 
The answers to these questions lie beyond this paper. Perhaps the important immediate 
lesson is that transmission experience in Argentina (and elsewhere) shows that there are 
alternatives to what might be called conventional regulation of monopoly networks. 
These alternatives involve a greater role for users of the network, with a smaller but still 
needed role for regulation. They have the potential to harness market disciplines more 
comprehensively so as to serve customers and other users more efficiently. There are 
indeed potential issues to do with transactions costs, incentives, information asymmetries 
and so on, but these can be dealt with. There are also political objectives to consider. 
However, involving users may well be more effective than conventional regulatory 
approaches, if the aim is to discover and promote the aggregate interests of customers and 
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 Public Contest Expansions in Argentina 

















canon  Process timing 















Bids not available  Accepted 
2 
Rincón - Salto 















Bids not available 
Accepted 















Initial bid  
$54.6m/yr first 3 
years, 
$61.4m/yr next 12 
years 
Rejected  
Res ENRE 49/1995 
ENRE File ID: 
668/94 





Transener  $ 23.7m 
No 
check 











Bids not available 
Accepted 
Res ENRE 40/1995 
ENRE File ID: 
809/94 
5 
Arroyito - Chocón 
Oeste 
132kV line 50km 




Rejected Res ENRE 
74/1996 
ENRE File ID: 
1084/95 
6 




 500kV line 
1291km 
Transener  $ 256.0m  $ 







Max.Fee: $ 43.7m/yr 
Winning bid: 
$ 24.5m/yr 
4 consortia / 14 bids 
(**) 
Accepted 
Res ENRE 613/1996 





500/132 kV 150 
MVA 





InOp: April 2001 
Max.Fee: $2.2m/yr 
Winning bid: $1.8 
m/yr 
Bids not available 
Accepted 
Res ENRE 296/1999 
ENRE File ID: 
3280/97 
8  'Recreo' 




Tend: March 1999 
InOp: October 
2000 
Max.Fee:  $1.7m/yr 
Winning bid: 
$1.5m/yr 
2 bids (1 rejected) 
Accepted 
Res ENRE 1472/1998 
ENRE File ID: 
4190/97   73
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Tend: March 1999 
InOp: June 2000 
Max.Fee:  $3.0m/yr 
Winning bid: 
$2.9m/yr 
Bids not available 
Accepted 
Res ENRE 1490/1998 
ENRE File ID: 
4478/97 
10a 
Recreo – San 
Martín 
132kV line 115km 
Cobra  $ 6.9m  No  10  $ 0.1m 
10b  Recreo – Frías  













Res ENRE 120/1999 
















Winning bid: $1.3 
m/yr 
Accepted 
Res ENRE 544/2000 





132/33/13.2 kV 30 
MVA 
---------  $ 4.9m  No  10  $ 0.1m 
Prop: 2000 
(Initially proposed 







Res ENRE 416/2001 
Suspended by ENRE 
(pesification) 
Res ENRE 523/2002 





132/66/13.2 kV  
20MVA 
Distrocuyo  $ 1.3m  No  8  $ 0.02m 
13b 










and $2.7m (Cruz de 
Piedra) 
Initiated by Transco 
(SE208/98) 
Accepted 
Res ENRE 329/2000 
Delayed - contract 
under renegotiation 
(pesification) 
ENRE File ID: 
6775/99 
14  Olavarría – Barker 




Tend: August 2000 
InOp: 18/10/2001 
Max.Fee: $1.4m/yr 
/ 15 years 
Winning bid: $2.2 
m/yr / 7 years 
1 bid 
Accepted 
Res ENRE 130/2000 
ENRE File ID: 
6935/99 and 7310/99 
15 
Mendoza –  
San Juan 
220 kV line 





Res ENRE 191/2000 
(Preliminary Project) 
ENRE File ID: 
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Transener  $ 4.5m  No  2  $ 0.2m 





Winning bid: $4.5m 
3 bids 
Initiated by Transco 
(SE208/98) 
Accepted 
Res ENRE 60/2003  
Under construction 













to $ 3.2 in 
2004 ) 




Initial bid for total 
price: $3.2m 
Accepted 
Res ENRE 261/2001 
and 230/2004 
Delayed - renegotiation 
of Initial Bid conditions 















Transener  $ 6.4m  $ 4.4m  1.8  $ 0.3m 
Prop: 2000 





and $6.4m (Rosario) 
Initiated by Transco 
(SE208/98) 
Accepted 
Res ENRE 495/2003 




ENRE File ID: 




500/132 kV 100 
MVA 
---------  $ 6.6m  No  5  $ 0.1m 
Prop: Aug 2000 
PubH Sep 01 
R: 14/9/2001 
------- 
Initiated by Transco 
(SE208/98) 
Rejected  
Res ENRE 501/2001 





500/132 kV 300 
MVA 





Initiated by Transco 
(SE208/98) 
Accepted 
Res ENRE 550/2003 




ENRE File ID: 
9068/00   75
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132/66/13.2 kV 30 
MVA 
---------  $ 1.3m  No  1  $ 0.1m 
Prop: Feb 01 
Susp: 31/1/2002 
Max.Fee: $1.4m/yr 
Initiated by Transco 
(SE208/98) 
Suspended at Provincial 
Regulator request 
before Public Hearing 
Res ENRE 47/2002 





132/66/13.2 kV 30 
MVA 
---------  $ 1.8m  No  1  $ 0.2m 
Prop: Feb 01 
Susp: 31/1/2002 
Max.Fee: $1.9m/yr 
Initiated by Transco 
(SE208/98) 
Suspended at Provincial 
Regulator request 
before Public Hearing 
Res ENRE 48/2002 
ENRE File ID: 
9972/01 
23 












2 bids (1 rejected) 
Accepted 
Res ENRE 518/2002 
Under construction 





500/132 kV 300 
MVA 
Transener  $ 7.3m  $ 5.1m  0.8  $ 0.8m 




Initiated by the Transco 
(SE208/98) 
Accepted 
Res ENRE 616/2003 
Tender announced 
16/7/2004 
ENRE File ID: 
12019/02 
25  










Res ENRE 323/2004  
Tender announced 
19/8/2004 
ENRE File ID: 
15055/03 
 
(*) Monthly fee is taken as the Maximum Canon for those expansions that were rejected or suspended, and 
taken from the public tender process for accepted expansions. It is calculated after any Salex contribution to 
initial costs but before any Salex contribution to the ongoing fee. 
(**) Two consortia (Transener and Líneas de Transmisión del Comahue) presented more than one bid 
reflecting alternative specifications. Detail of bids: Atalaya Energy $39.5m/yr; Compañía Transportadora de 
Electricidad del Comahue $38.0m/yr; Transener a) $26.0m/yr b) $24.5m/yr c) $24.8m/yr; Líneas de Transmisión del 
Comahue a) $27.8m/yr b) $27.2m/yr c) $27.0m/yr d) $27.1m/yr e) $26.5m/yr f) $26.3m/yr g) $25.7m/yr h) $25.0m/yr 
i) $24.9m/yr. 
Abbreviations on process timing: Prop: Proposed; PubH: Public Hearing; Acpt: Accepted; Rej: Rejected; 
Susp: Suspended; Tend: Tender bids presented and usually technical proposals opened; InOp: In operation 
 
 
 